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Abstract 
Russian multinationals play an active role in international capital flows, although, over the past decade, 
two financial crises have interrupted the upward trend of their outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI). This paper focuses on the specific characteristics of Russian OFDI and multinationals in general, 
in particular regarding their presence in the European Union – Russia’s prime export market and the 
main destination of Russian OFDI – and, more specifically, five EU-member Central and East European 
states, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Besides official statistics, 
the research relies on company data gathered to present the activities of Russian multinationals in this 
region. Among the investment motives, the focus is on home-country push factors, both negative and 
positive. The paper also asks whether the emergence and presence of Russian multinationals could be 
explained by using an existing FDI framework. 
JEL: D22, F23, M16 
Keywords: outward foreign direct investment, multinational enterprises, Russia, Europe, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) from emerging economies has recently grown 
rapidly due to the multinational enterprises (MNEs) in these countries.1 Among these, 
Russian multinationals play a very active role (Kalotay et al., 2014). UNCTAD FDI 
database suggests that, with the exception of 2015, Russia has since 2002 been among 
the top 20 countries in the world with the largest outward FDI (OFDI) stock.2 It achieved 
                                                 
* This paper was supported by Hungary’s National Research, Development and Innovation Office under 
Grant No. K-120053. 
a Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, H-1097 Budapest, Hungary. Email: weiner.csaba [at] 
krtk.mta.hu. 
1 Since 2015, UNCTAD has been using the term “multinational enterprises” instead of “transnational 
corporations” (TNCs). We follow this change in this paper. Thus, here, we do not differentiate between 
multinational, global and transnational companies. 
2 Similarly, the acronym for inward foreign direct investment is IFDI. 
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its best result in 2013, occupying the 13th place. Also with the exception of 2015, Russia 
has been ranked among the top 15 countries of FDI outflows since 2003. Russia reached 
the top 10 in 2008 (No. 10), 2009 (No. 9), 2013 (No. 6) and 2014 (No. 7) (UNCTAD FDI 
database, n.d.). 
This paper is the first part of a four-year research project into the international 
expansion of non-European emerging-market multinationals, including those from 
Russia. The first year has focused on the general characteristics of Russian OFDI and 
multinationals, and their presence in the EU and five CEE countries, including the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Among the investment motives, 
home-country push factors have been addressed, while the second year will examine the 
pull factors responsible for Russian FDI inflows into these five CEE countries. 
Furthermore, whilst the third year will attempt to establish the main concerns, 
challenges and negative impact of Russian multinationals on the five CEE markets, the 
fourth year will explore the opportunities and positive impacts Russian multinationals 
can provide for this region. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the general characteristics of 
Russian OFDI and multinationals. First, they are put into historical context (Section 2.1), 
and then a presentation of their size and geographical structure (Section 2.2), as well as 
of the industrial distribution (Section 2.3) is provided. In Section 2.4, the motives of 
Russian OFDI investors are investigated in detail. First, an analysis is conducted of 
whether extant FDI theorems are able to explain Russian OFDI (Section 2.4.1). Next, we 
provide a brief overview of pull factors driving Russian OFDI (Section 2.4.2). More detail 
is given regarding push factors (Section 2.4.3), including the Russian state’s role in 
promoting foreign expansion (Section 2.4.3.1). Section 3 is centred on the role of the EU 
in Russian OFDI and the expansion of Russian multinationals. Again, their size (Section 
3.1), geographical structure (Section 3.2), industrial distribution (Section 3.3) and also 
EU-specific motives (Section 3.4) are presented. Section 4 focuses on Russian FDI and 
multinationals in five CEE countries. We take a country-by-country snapshot of the main 
Russian-involved companies (Section 4.1), and, regarding the FDI theorems, we ask 
whether the presence of Russian multinationals may be explained by using an existing 
framework (Section 4.2). Finally, Section 5 offers a summary and some conclusions. 
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2. General characteristics of Russian OFDI and multinationals 
 
2.1. The historical context of Russian OFDI and multinationals 
The history of Russian OFDI dates back to the nineteenth century and covers six main 
periods: (1) OFDI before the socialist era; (2) the stagnation of OFDI after the Russian 
Revolution of 1917; (3) the gradual growth of the foreign activities of red multinationals 
in the period from the end of the 1960s until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; 
(4) the emergence of the first real Russian multinationals in 1992–1996; (5) the golden 
era of Russian multinationals between 1997 and 2008; and (6) the survival of Russian 
multinationals during the global financial meltdown and the Ukrainian conflict [and the 
most recent 2014–2016 crisis] (Liuhto and Majuri, 2014: 211). 
According to Bulatov (1998: 69), Russian FDI started to flow out of the country in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century. The main destinations were China, Persia and 
Mongolia. Between 1886 and 1914, capital exports were roughly as high as RUB 2.3 
billion, equivalent to USD 33 billion in 1996 prices. 
Between the two World Wars, the Soviet Union did not withdraw all the capital 
invested abroad but drastically cut it. To support trade with Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan 
and Mongolia, a network of trading companies was established and they were operated 
in these traditional partner countries. West European trading companies were set up 
only later. In addition, banks, transport, insurance and other companies were also 
formed abroad with Soviet capital (Bulatov, 1998: 69–70). 
After the Second World War, the number of companies abroad increased somewhat 
(Bulatov, 1998: 70), but still there were not so many, as a result of various ideological, 
political and economic barriers (Liuhto, 2001: 35). It was more typical to grant 
government loans to selected countries (Bulatov, 1998: 70). By the end of 1983, Soviet 
companies had established 116 affiliates in the more industrially-advanced (OECD) 
economies (i.e. the West) and 27 in developing countries (i.e. the South or the Third 
World) (McMillan, 1987: 36–41). In his 1987 article, Abraham Guillén published a list of 
72 Soviet multinational enterprises with foreign investment holdings in 22 capitalist 
countries (Guillen, 2001: 153). The bulk of Soviet subsidiaries in the West were engaged 
in the marketing of oil, metals, timber, chemicals, machinery and vehicles (Liuhto, 2001: 
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36). They reached a low level of transnationalization. Few of these companies showed 
signs of developing as Western multinationals had done (Filippov, 2008: 6). 
In 1988, there were a total of 125 Soviet companies in 35 different countries. Their 
role in foreign trade was well shown by the fact that they were selling about 40 per cent 
of Soviet oil and oil product exports, 60 per cent of the timber, paper and cellulose 
exports and more than 50 per cent of the exports of civilian-use manufactured goods 
(Bulatov, 1998: 70). 
Soviet companies were also not particularly active in other states of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). In the mid-1980s, only a few joint 
enterprises were operating. However, their number jumped due to expanding foreign-
trade rights in the Soviet Union related to Gorbachev’s Perestroika and the 
improvements introduced in joint venture legislation in Eastern Europe. By 1990, at 
least 175 Soviet-owned joint ventures were registered in the European CMEA countries: 
68 in Poland, 50 in Hungary, 38 in Bulgaria, 21 in Yugoslavia and 4 in Czechoslovakia 
(Liuhto, 2001: 36). 
In 1990, the Soviet OFDI stock amounted to only USD 699 million, as compared to 
USD 388 million in 1983 and USD 378 million in 1987 (Andreff, 2003: 77). Prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of Soviet companies was only between 300 and 
400. One needs to bear in mind that their foreign operations were motivated not only by 
business logic but also by political goals. It is also notable that most of the Soviet 
companies abroad were controlled by Russian firms. Therefore, after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, it was Russia who inherited the Soviet business units abroad (Liuhto, 
2001: 37). 
Based on official statistics, UNCTAD data show the stock of Russian OFDI remained 
below USD 5 billion in themid-1990s. It was less than USD 10 billion at the end of the 
1990s and amounted to only USD 19.2 billion at the end of 2000 (UNCTAD FDI database, 
n.d.).3 However, some observers believe the stock of Russian OFDI had exceeded the 
above-mentioned data for 2000 by the mid-1990s. For example, Rybkin (1995) and 
Gorshenin (1995) calculated that the stock of total investment abroad (direct, portfolio 
                                                 
3 The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) is currently providing stock data only for the period starting at end-
2009 (CBR, 2017c), whereas the UNCTAD database has been recording data since 1993 (UNCTAD FDI 
database, n.d.). Although UNCTAD works with data from the CBR, its numbers differ from those of the CBR 
due to CBR data revisions. 
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and other) achieved USD 130 billion at the beginning of 1995. Khaldin and Andrianov 
(1996)4 put this at over USD 300 billion, with direct and portfolio investment each 
accounting for USD 30-40 billion (cited by Bulatov, 1998: 71–72). Criticizing these 
estimates, Bulatov (1998: 72) calculated OFDI stock from Russia to be in the range of 
USD 20–30 billion. At this time, the related Russian authority had data on only 2,000 
foreign subsidiaries, while the real number could have been tens of thousands, mainly 
small offshore companies, which amounted to 60,000 according to Khaldin and 
Andrianov (1996) (also cited by Bulatov, 1998: 72). 
The actual state of the economy and the changing role of the Russian state have been 
reflected in Russia’s OFDI data. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, four crises have 
shaken the Russian economy: (1) the transformational recession of 1992–1996,5 (2) the 
currency, fiscal, debt and banking crisis in 1998, (3) the global financial crisis of 2008–
2009, and (4) the recent crisis that began in 2014, caused by low oil prices and Western 
sanctions against Russia over its actions in Ukraine. Although the Russian economy 
returned to modest growth in 2017 (World Bank, 2017), these two external factors 
continue to exert pressure. 
Russia’s capitalism does not have solid roots. Rather, it is based on a centrally 
planned economy and a socialist society (Menshikov, 1999). While the basic institutions 
of the market economy were quickly established in Russia, many features of the old 
system have been preserved. Since the early 1990s, however, the political and economic 
systems have undergone substantial changes. The main dividing line was the targeted 
campaign launched against the Yukos oil company in 2003. State–business relations 
have changed significantly since that time. Following a largely liberal capitalist system, 
the state has substantially expanded its role in the economy, and thus an etatist period 
began (Vasileva, 2014). The crises of 2008–2009 and 2014–2016 have not contributed 
to a further such significant increase in the role of the Russian state (Weiner, 2016). 
During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (1991–1999), the Russian state actively contributed to 
the creation of large private monopolies, giving birth to future multinationals (Kalotay, 
2008a: 58; 2008b: 98). In 2001, Russia’s 23 largest companies accounted for 30 per cent 
                                                 
4 Khaldin and Andrianov (1996) is cited here after Bulatov (1998). However, it should be noted that in his 
publications Andrianov refers to this paper without mentioning a co-author as Andrianov (1996). 
5 According to Csaba (2006: 315), Russia experienced a transformational recession between 1994 and 
1997, while the years 1992 and 1993 were dedicated to the reordering of power relations. 
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of the GDP. These companies were under the control of 37 individuals (Rutland, 2012: 
290). In 2003, 23 oligarchs controlled 35 per cent of the industrial production (while the 
state had 25 per cent) and 17 per cent of the banking sector assets (while 26 per cent 
belonged to the state) (Dutkiewicz, 2011: 17).6 
In the 1990s, Russian OFDI did exist but it could mostly be regarded as capital flight 
from an unstable environment to offshore paradises and tax havens rather than the 
internationalisation of the companies (Filippov, 2008: 6–8). Due to negative domestic 
push factors, this kind of OFDI, called an “exodus” by Vahtra and Liuhto (2004), appears 
from time to time. This is closely associated with the phenomenon of “round-tripping” 
(i.e. FDI leaving the country and returning) (see Box 1 later in the paper). The opposite 
of exodus is “expansion”, which is driven by either international pull7 or positive 
domestic push factors. Due to round-tripping and another closely related phenomenon, 
“trans-shipping”, Cyprus, the Netherlands and the British Virgin Islands lead the eternal 
list of Russian FDI recipients (see below in details). For example, the main holding 
companies of the largest Russian steel producers (Evraz, Mechel, Severstal, NLMK, MMK 
and TMK) are registered in Cyprus. Russian steel magnates own their companies 
through these holding companies (Fortescue and Hanson, 2015: 295–296). The degree of 
concentration of Russian OFDI stock in (and IFDI stock from) certain jurisdictions is the 
result of the combination of traditional (tax minimization – a pull factor) and non-
traditional motives (the high monopolization of the national economy, insufficient 
safeguarding of private business, a poor level of financial market development – push 
factors) of FDI outflows from Russia (Bulatov et al., 2016: 400). The latter motives are no 
less important than tax avoidance (Bulatov, 2017: 86). 
                                                 
6 In June 2003, 10 leading families or ownership groups owned 60.2 per cent of the Russian stock market 
(Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005: 139). Analysing the top 64 listed Russian companies in 2002, Boone and 
Rodionov (2002) found that the eight largest groups controlled 49 per cent of these companies’ output and 
the state controlled another 43 per cent (cited by Guriev, 2010: 526). In the summer of 2003, the World 
Bank conducted a survey that sought to incorporate non-listed companies as well. The 22 leading business 
groups provided about 40 per cent of industrial revenues and employment. Government ownership was 
estimated at about 30 per cent, while foreign ownership was below 10 per cent (World Bank, 2005, cited 
by Guriev, 2010: 526). 
7 For international pull factors, we do not use either positive or negative attributes, as we believe that they 
are positive in themselves, or at least we cannot find any negative international pull factors or a case 
where an international pull factor is coupled with exodus. 
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According to the data collected by the CBR, FDI outflows from Russia received a big 
boost first in 2003 and then in 2006 (Table 1). In 2008, they hit a new record high (CBR, 
2017a). In the 2000s, the marked rise in international energy and commodity prices led 
to spectacular developments in resource-based sectors in Russia, encouraging Russian 
companies to venture abroad (Filippov, 2008: 7). Oil and gas and metallurgical 
companies made huge OFDI, typically driven by quests for markets and resources 
(Kuznetsov, 2013a: 3). Russian companies were ready to expand after several years of 
progressively developing their competitive advantages within Russia. However, the 
increase in statistics can also be attributed to the fact that the CBR began to record OFDI 
in a more accurate manner (i.e. it had likely previously under-reported) (Panibratov, 
2017a: 284). 
 
Table 1. FDI outflows from, and inflows into, Russia, according to the CBR and Rosstat (Russian Federal 
State Statistics Service), 1992–2016 (millions of dollars) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CBR 
Balance   -408 -1 460 -1 656 -1 681 -1 552 -1 091 501 -306 59 1 795 -1 621 2 372 
Outflows   281 606 923 3 184 1 210 2 195 3 179 2 541 3 533 9 724 13 782 17 880 
Inflows   690 2 066 2 579 4 865 2 761 3 286 2 678 2 847 3 474 7 929 15 403 15 508 
UNCTAD 
Outflows 1 566 1 022 281 606 923 3 184 1 210 2 195 3 152 2 502 3 484 9 550 13 663 16 747 
Inflows 1 161 1 211 690 2 066 2 579 4 865 2 761 3 286 2 651 2 808 3 425 7 755 15 284 14 375 
Rosstat 
Outflows    20     382 495 303 283 2 064 558 
Inflows    2 020     4 429 3 980 4 002 6 781 9 420 13 072 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
CBR 
Balance -7 602 -11 072 -19 120 6 697 9 448 11 767 -1 765 17 288 35 051 15 232 -10 225 
Outflows 29 993 44 801 55 663 43 281 52 616 66 851 48 822 86 507 57 082 22 085 22 314 
Inflows 37 595 55 874 74 783 36 583 43 168 55 084 50 588 69 219 22 031 6 853 32 539 
UNCTAD            
Outflows 29 840 43 849 56 735 34 450 41 116 48 635 28 423 70 685 64 203 27 090 27 272 
Inflows 37 442 54 922 75 856 27 752 31 668 36 868 30 188 53 397 29 152 11 858 37 668 
Rosstat 
Outflows 3 208 9 179 21 818 17 454 10 271 19 040 17 426 76 265    
Inflows 13 678 27 797 27 027 15 906 13 810 18 415 18 666 26 118    
Note: Grey cells indicate years when FDI outflows exceeded FDI inflows. 
Source: Own compilation based on CBR (2017a), Rosstat (2014a, 2014c) and UNCTAD FDI database (n.d.). 
 
The growth of Russian assets abroad has largely been driven by cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) (Kuznetsov, 2013a: 7). The remarkable acceleration in the 
outward expansion of Russian firms during the 2000s was possible only due to large-
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scale acquisitions, given the fact that greenfield FDI projects are more time-consuming 
and capital-intensive than M&As (Kalotay, 2015a: 244). 
The effects of the global financial crisis began to be felt as of the third quarter of 2008 
onwards, followed by a significant decline in 2009 (CBR, 2017a). Russian metal giants 
suffered the consequences of the downturn more than Russian oil and gas companies 
(Kuznetsov, 2010a: 12). Steel companies have considerably cut their OFDI since the late 
2000s (Fortescue and Hanson, 2015). 
However, two years later, in 2011, Russian FDI outflows stood at a new record level, 
and yet another record was set in 2013. This impetus was broken when the Russian 
crisis began in 2014 (CBR, 2017a). The fall in oil prices from June 2014, as well as 
Western sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions directly led to this crisis. The rouble 
underwent sharp depreciation. Even though recognized for a long time, serious 
structural problems of the Russian economy were finally brought to light. Russian 
multinationals have faced constraints in international financial markets. Sanctions 
against Russian banks financing Russian multinationals represent a big threat to Russian 
OFDI (UNCTAD, 2015: 69). Consequently, the year 2014 saw a drastic reduction in 
Russian FDI flows – in both directions (CBR, 2017a). Moreover, a new Russian anti-
offshore law took effect in January 2015, aiming to prevent the cash drain from Russia to 
offshore centres, the use of cross-border tax evasion schemes and, thus, to reduce 
round-tripping investment (UNCTAD, 2016: 7, 94). In 2015, Russian FDI outflows 
continued to decline, and they only increased slightly in 2016. However, as during the 
2008–2009 crisis, significant acquisitions still took place in 2014–2016 (UNCTAD, 2016: 
62; 2017a: 68). 
During the global financial depression, in 2009, FDI inflows into Russia suffered more 
than Russian FDI outflows. Also, in 2014 and 2015, FDI inflows were more severely 
affected than the other direction. In 2016, however, FDI inflows into Russia increased 
significantly. In some years prior to 2009, Russian FDI outflows had already exceeded 
FDI inflows into Russia. This phenomenon, however, has been much more pronounced 
since the 2008–2009 crisis. According to the CBR, Russia was a net FDI exporter in all 
the years between 2009 and 2015, except for 2009 (Table 1). In 2015, the ratio of 
outflows and inflows reached a record high (CBR, 2017a). Moreover, in 2014 and 2015, 
Russia’s OFDI stock was also larger than the IFDI stock (Table 2) (CBR, 2017b, 2017c). 
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Table 2. OFDI stock from, and IFDI stock in, Russia, according to the CBR, end of period, 1993–2016 
(millions of dollars) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CBR 
OFDI              
IFDI              
UNCTAD 
OFDI 2 301 2 588 3 346 4 390 7 633 8 866 9 553 19 211 43 254 61 248 89 522 105 773 139 241 
IFDI 183 3 280 5 601 8 145 13 612 12 912 18 303 29 738 50 544 68 847 94 511 120 201 178 635 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
CBR 
OFDI    298 357 361 121 361 750 409 567 479 501 411 270 367 593 419 453 
IFDI    377 447 488 993 454 949 514 926 565 654 371 491 347 690 462 697 
UNCTAD 
OFDI 232 881 363 481 197 273 288 289 336 355 315 742 332 834 385 321 329 817 282 651 335 791 
IFDI 263 903 488 280 212 887 367 379 464 228 408 942 438 194 471 474 290 039 262 748 379 035 
Note: Grey cells indicate years when OFDI stock exceeded IFDI stock. 
Source: Own compilation based on CBR (2017b, 2017c) and UNCTAD FDI database (n.d.). 
 
Russian multinationals share several common characteristics: a monopolistic (or 
oligopolistic) position in Russia, a leading position in the sector, sufficient export 
revenues to finance operations abroad and the willingness to be active on a global scale 
(Panibratov, 2017a: 284). Table 3 illustrates the top 20 Russian non-financial 
multinationals ranked by foreign assets in 2014.8 Out of these, eight were state-
controlled: Gazprom (of which the government owns more than 50 per cent), Rosneft 
(70%) and Zarubezhneft (100%) in the oil and gas industry; Russian Railways (100%), 
Sovkomflot (100%), Transneft (78%) in transportation; Inter RAO (71%) in electricity; 
and Atomenergoprom (100%) in nuclear energy (Bulatov et al., 2016: 399). 
Russia’s leading multinationals have a concentrated ownership structure, with either 
government supremacy or oligarchic dominance (Liuhto, 2016: 260). The ownership 
structure of Russian private multinationals usually differs from that of their typical 
Western counterparts.9 As Fortescue and Hanson (2015: 303) put it regarding Russian 
steel companies, due to their ownership structure, they are too exposed to debt for 
expansion because oligarchs who control these companies do not want to open up their 
share registers in any substantial way. Thus, they are not able to provide equity in the  
 
                                                 
8 Although well known, we still wish to emphasize that FDI, M&A and foreign assets are three different 
concepts. 
9 None of their free-floats exceeds 50 per cent (Kuznetsov, 2013a: 5). 
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Table 3. The top 20 Russian non-financial multinationals ranked by foreign assets, 2014 
Rank Company Main industry Main owner(s) Foreign  
assets 
(bln USD) 
2014 2009 2013 2014 
1 2 Gazprom Oil and gas State: 50,002% 40.1 36.0 
2 1 Lukoil Oil and gas Vagit Alekperov: 22.96%; Leonid Fedun: 
9.78% (the management has a controlling 
shareholding) 
32.6 32.9 
3 8 VimpelCom  Telecom Alfa-Group (Mikhail Fridman) 36.8 30.4 
4 23 Rosneft  Oil and gas Controlled by the state  8.4 9.4 
5 4 Evraz  Steel Controlled by Roman Abramovich, Alexander 
Abramov and Alexander Frolov 
8.7 5.3 
6 6 Sovkomflot  Transport State: 100% 5.3 5.3 
7 10 Rusal  Non-ferrous 
metallurgy 
En+ (Oleg Dripaska]): 48,13%; Sual’s 
shareholders: 22.80%; Amokenga Holdings 
(Glencore): 8.75%; Onexim (Mikhail 
Prohorov): 6.70% 
3.7 2.8 
8 >25 Russian Railways  Transport State: 100% 3.2 2.8 
9 12 TMK  Steel Controlled by Dmitry Pumpyansky 2.6 2.5 
10 13 Zarubezhneft  Oil and gas State: 100% 2.4 2.4 
11 16 Atomenergoprom  Nuclear State: 100% 2.8 2.4 
12 5 Sistema  Conglomerate Controlled by Vladimir Yevtushenkov 3.0 1.7 
13 –* Nordgold  Non-ferrous 
metallurgy 
Controlled by Alexei Mordashov 1.7 1.6 
14 15 Inter RAO UES Electricity Controlled by the state  1.6 1.6 
15 21 Eurochem  Chemicals Controlled by Andrey Melnichenko 1.5 1.4 
16 8 NLMK  Steel Controlled by Vladimir Lisin 1.6 1.3 
17 14 Transneft  Transport State: 100% 1.5 1.1 
18 25 MMK  Ferrous 
metallurgy 
Controlled by Viktor Rashnikov 1.1 1.0 
19 >25 Polymetal  Non-ferrous 
metallurgy 
Alexander Nesis, Petr Kellner and Alexander 
Mamut 
0.2 1.0 
20 11 Norilsk Nickel  Non-ferrous 
metallurgy 
Interros (Vladimir Potanin): 30.3%; Rusal: 
27.8%; Crispian Investment (Roman 
Abramovich and Alexander Abramov): 6.3% 
0.6 0.7 
Total top 20 159.4  143.6 
>25 3 Severstal  Steel Controlled by Alexei Mordashov 4.8 0.4 
>25 7 Mechel  Steel Controlled by Igor Zyuzin 2.8 0.1 
* At that time, Nordgold was not independent, but only a gold-mining division of Severstal. However, if 
considered separately, it would be among the top 20. 
Note: Grey cells indicate state-owned or state-controlled Russian multinationals. 
Source: Kuznetsov (2016: 82) and own compilation. 
 
volumes required over the long term to build a truly global company. In difficult times, it 
is very likely that they will not be able to finance their acquisitions. 
No Russian companies appeared on the list of the world’s top 100 non-financial 
multinationals ranked by foreign assets in 2016 (UNCTAD, 2017b). On the other hand, 
only Lukoil (No. 28), Russia’s biggest non-state oil producer, and the gas giant Gazprom 
(No. 48) could make it to the list of the top 100 non-financial multinationals from 
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developing and transition economies ranked by foreign assets in 2015 (UNCTAD, 
2017c). 
 
2.2. The size and geographical distribution of Russian OFDI 
For a long time, both the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Federal State 
Statistics Service provided official data on Russian OFDI. However, since 2014, only CBR 
data have been available. A common feature of these FDI statistics is that they are 
organized on the basis of the immediate host and investing country, and not according to 
the ultimate host and investing country. This is particularly problematic as certain third 
countries, largely de jure or de facto tax havens and offshore centres, play a significant 
role in intermediating Russian FDI. At a later stage, FDI is trans-shipped to the final 
target country or round-tripped back to Russia (Kalotay et al., 2014: 6).10 
 
Box 1. Indirect FDI, special-purpose entities, round-tripping and trans-shipping 
Within the term “foreign direct investment”, “direct” refers to the 10 per cent threshold of 
voting power or equity ownership. In the case of “indirect FDI”, however, the term “indirect” 
means the use of a third-country subsidiary for FDI purposes. The method of financing indirect 
FDI is called trans-shipment (Kalotay, 2012: 546). In the Russian case, this intermediate (or 
immediate) foreign company is predominantly a special-purpose vehicle/entity (SPV/SPE). 
SPEs have no or little linkages with the domestic (resident) economy (UNECE, 2011; Montvai, 
2015) and play a role in the intermediation of substantial financial resources within groups of 
companies (MNB, 2014). SPEs can be either offshore or onshore companies (but can no longer 
be offshores in the EU), providing taxation, regulatory and confidentiality benefits (Tavakoli, 
2003; IMF, 2004).1 An SPE can be a holding company (and this foreign holding company of a 
Russian firm purchases a company in a third country), but not every holding company is an SPE 
(for details, see Dippelsman, 2004). There are also examples when the intermediary company is 
engaged in activities linked to the resident (e.g. Polish or Austrian) economy (e.g. a foreign 
subsidiary of a Russian company establishes or buys a company in a third country). Naturally, 
one does not necessarily need to assume suspicious transactions behind all investments 
through a third country. 
Trans-shipment and round-tripping are not unique features of Russian FDI. Trans-shipment 
is well known among Brazilian multinationals, while round-tripping is also a phenomenon 
among their Chinese peers (Campanario et al., 2012: 3–6; Kalotay et al., 2014: 6). One of the 
consequences of trans-shipment and round-tripping is that the immediate host/investing 
country and ultimate host/investing country differ from each other. Therefore, certain 
countries are more concerned with FDI flows than their real economic significance would imply 
(Antalóczy and Sass, 2014: 38). Ultimately, FDI statistics on the immediate host/investing 
country do not provide a complete image of Russian OFDI. To achieve a more accurate view, one 
needs to look at company data and case studies (Weiner, 2017a: 195). 
 
                                                 
10 Kuznetsov (2013b: 93) considers round-tripping FDI as pseudo FDI. 
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According to the CBR, at the end of 2016, Russia’s OFDI stock was USD 419 billion, 
still far from the record level of USD 480 billion at the end of 2013 (Table 2) (CBR, 
2017c). Yet, because of round-tripping, both inward and outward FDI are overestimated 
(Kuznetsov, 2017: 78–79). Kuznetsov (2017: 79) concludes that at least one fourth of the 
Russian OFDI stock is pseudo-foreign. Sergey Glazyev, economic adviser to President 
Putin, went as far as to say that 85 per cent of FDI in Russia was investment by Russian 
businesses through offshore entities (Bulatov, 2017). Foreign assets of the top 20 
Russian non-financial multinationals reached USD 143.6 billion at the end of 2014 
(Kuznetsov, 2016: 82). 
The economic crisis of 2014–2016 and the new Russian anti-offshore law have 
reduced the scale and scope of round-tripping FDI (UNCTAD, 2016: 60). In principle, 
OFDI suffers from devaluation, because it takes more domestic currency to buy the same 
foreign goods, and if foreign investment is covered by domestic profits, its financing 
leads to losses. The situation is different in round-tripping, where foreign profits are 
also sources of financing. These are not affected by devaluation. Regarding trans-
shipment, the problem is that if sanctions are in place, then one of its main advantages, 
i.e. access to foreign funds (e.g. bank loans), is curtailed (Kálmán Kalotay, personal 
communication, 2 November 2015). In practice, Cyprus’ FDI stock in Russia has 
significantly decreased. Some of the investments in offshore centres are trans-shipped to 
third countries rather than recycled back into Russia. This trend has been reflected in 
the decreasing FDI stock from the British Virgin Islands (UNCTAD, 2016: 60). However, 
as Panibratov (2017a: 284) states, the next few years may see some capital return to 
Russia. 
Unlike other BRIC countries (consisting of Brazil, Russia, India and China), the bulk of 
Russia’s OFDI stock is in developed countries (UNCTAD, 2016: 12). The most important 
destinations for Russian OFDI are Europe and the United States (UNCTAD, 2015: 69). 
These observations are based on CBR data, according to both the asset/liability 
presentation and the directional principle.11 At the end of 2011, 39 per cent of foreign 
assets of the top 20 Russian multinationals were located in Europe, excluding the CIS, 
Georgia and Turkey (Kuznetsov, 2013a: 15). 
                                                 
11 In both cases, data are consistent with the methodology set out in the 6th edition of the IMF’s Balance of 
Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6). 
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CBR data show most of Russia’s OFDI stock is still in Cyprus and the Netherlands, two 
developed EU countries, and the British Virgin Islands, a developing Caribbean economy, 
statistically part of Latin America and the Caribbean (like the Bahamas and the Cayman 
Islands). As a result, the role of Latin America and the Caribbean is overstated. The real 
Russian FDI stock data for this region is 15–30 times less than official statistics indicate 
(Kuznetsov, 2017: 79). 
By definition, Cyprus and the Netherlands are neither tax havens nor offshore 
jurisdictions, but in reality, many EU countries – including, for example, Luxembourg – 
should be historically included into these categories (Weiner, 2017b: 95). Moreover, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Austria and Switzerland are also leading “conduit countries” 
(Bulatov et al., 2016: 400).12 Outside Europe, even Canada can act as a trans-shipment 
terminal (Kuznetsov, 2017: 79). Compiled from data from the CBR, Table 4 clearly shows 
that Cyprus also takes the first place among FDI investors in Russia. Here, the role of 
round-tripping is quite obvious. According to Kuznetsov (2017: 80), the Netherlands has 
attracted very modest amounts of real Russian investment (see below in Section 3.2). 
 
Table 4. The top 15 host countries for Russian OFDI stock and the top 15 sources of Russia’s IFDI stock, 
according to the CBR, based on the asset/liability principle, end of period, 2013, 2016 (millions of dollars) 
OFDI stock from Russia IFDI stock in Russia 
2013 2016 2013 2016 
Cyprus 163 066 Cyprus 150 547 Cyprus 193 640 Cyprus 144 021 
BVI 81 818 Netherlands 60 198 Netherlands 64 538 Netherlands 46 442 
Netherlands 60 601 BVI 42 111 Luxembourg 42 929 Luxembourg 44 634 
Austria 25 891 Austria 22 128 Bahamas 32 040 Bahamas 33 519 
USA 21 547 Switzerland 19 602 Bermuda 29 754 Ireland 29 965 
Switzerland 12 890 Luxembourg 12 738 Ireland 29 064 Bermuda 22 220 
Luxembourg 11 352 UK 9 557 BVI 26 332 Germany 16 908 
Germany 9 886 Turkey 8 903 UK 23 050 BVI 15 198 
UK 9 192 USA 8 345 Germany 19 177 Singapore 14 698 
Bahamas 6 492 Germany 8 138 USA 18 583 France 14 466 
Ukraine 5 971 Bahamas 6 766 Sweden 16 200 Switzerland 13 542 
Turkey 5 279 Spain 6 329 France 14 112 UK 12 260 
Spain 4 783 Ireland 5 445 Austria 12 207 Jersey 11 547 
Jersey 4 138 Belarus 3 835 Switzerland 6 834 Austria 5 242 
Belarus 4 114 Ukraine 3 427 Jersey 5 023 Sweden 3 891 
BVI – British Virgin Islands. 
Note: Grey cells indicate the EU states. 
Source: Own compilation based on CBR (2017b, 2017c). 
 
                                                 
12 In contrast, based on the directional principle, Russian FDI stock in Luxembourg and Ireland are 
negative (Kuznetsov, 2017: 80; CBR, 2017e). 
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Relying on official statistics, UNCTAD (2017: 68) claims Russian firms have targeted 
emerging markets moderately. According to these statistics, CIS countries have attracted 
only minor Russian OFDI, mainly concentrated in Kazakhstan and Ukraine (UNCTAD, 
2017: 68). But based on extensive company-level data, Kuznetsov (2017: 79) argues that 
besides the West (including primarily the US and a number of EU members), 
neighbouring Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus are also among the leading recipients of 
Russian multinational capital. More specifically, Russian FDI stock is underestimated by 
at least 2.5–3 times in Ukraine, by 3–4 times in Kazakhstan and by about 50 per cent in 
Belarus. 
Likewise, Russian FDI stock in Asia is underreported by at least twofold and in Africa 
by tenfold (Kuznetsov, 2017: 81). Although Russia has also dipped a toe in African 
waters (Panibratov, 2017a: 284), the value of Russian FDI has remained insignificant on 
that continent (Kuznetsov, 2017: 80). Kuznetsov (2017: 80) notes the rise in the 
significance of Turkey, Thailand, some other Asian countries13 and the members of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. Observing the shifts in the geographic focus of Russian OFDI, 
Panibratov (2017a: 284) thinks that it is the other BRICS countries that arouse the envy 
of Russian companies. 
For certain countries, CBR data are withheld for confidentiality reasons. If a figure is 
made up of data of less than three companies, then this should be treated as confidential, 
and thus is not shown on public-use files (Weiner, 2017a: 199). For example, the CBR 
does not provide data on Russian FDI stock in several Asian and African countries. At the 
same time, flow data are published. However, they are less important (Kuznetsov, 2017: 
80). 
 
2.3. Industrial distribution of Russian OFDI 
The CBR does not provide data on the sectoral distribution of Russian OFDI, while 
Rosstat reports only flow data containing information up until 2013. In the period 
between 2005 and 2013, these data suggest that manufacturing as well as wholesale, 
retail and repair sectors tended to attract the most Russian FDI, leaving only minor 
shares for the financial sectors (see Tables 5a and 5b) (Rosstat, 2009, 2014b). Following 
                                                 
13 Headed by Alexey Kuznetsov, the research team of the Moscow-based IMEMO-Institute sees good growth 
prospects for Russian FDI in Iran, India and Vietnam (EABR, 2017: 22). 
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a different classification, one can see that among the top 20 or 25 Russian 
multinationals, oil and gas as well as metallurgy are predominant. In the service sector, 
infrastructural companies occupy a dominant position (Bulatov et al., 2016: 405). 
Between 2004 and 2008, the role of oil and gas declined, but increased again in 2009 
and 2011 (Table 6) (Skolkovo, 2007a: 10; 2007b: 6; 2008: 8; IMEMO, 2009: 15; 2011: 22; 
Kuznetsov, 2013a: 19). Out of the 20 leading non-financial Russian multinationals 
ranked by foreign assets in 2014, eight were in metallurgy, four in oil and gas, three in 
transportation and one in each of the following sectors: chemicals, nuclear energy, 
electricity and telecommunications. Also, one leading Russian multinational is a 
conglomerate (Bulatov et al., 2016: 399). In contrast, the industrial distribution is much 
more diverse in the second echelon of Russian multinationals (Bulatov et al., 2016: 405). 
In Europe, Asia and Africa, the sectoral distribution of Russian OFDI is quite diversified, 
while in North America, Russian FDI has mainly been delivered by metallurgical 
multinationals (Kuznetsov, 2010b: 28; 2017: 82). According to IMEMO’s FDI project 
database, incorporating projects for which FDI stock exceeds USD 3 million, in non-CIS 
Eurasia, at the end of 2016, most Russian FDI stock was directed at oil and gas (34.3%),  
 
Table 5a. Sectoral distribution of Russian FDI outflows, according to Rosstat, 2005–2008 (millions of 
dollars and per cent) 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 
mln USD % 
Total 558 3 208 9 180 21 818 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry – – – – – – – – 
Fishing – – – – – – – – 
Mining and quarrying 0.0 18 116 775 0.00 0.56 1.26 3.55 
Manufacturing 303 2 562 2 210 9 885 54.30 79.86 24.07 45.31 
Electricity, gas and water supply – 14 – 1 089 – 0.44 – 4.99 
Construction 0.1 2 3 0.2 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.00 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal 
and household goods 
243 344 6701 8 246 43.55 10.72 73.00 37.79 
Hotels and restaurants – – – – – – – – 
Transport and communication 0.0 0.2 4 302 0.00 0.01 0.04 1.38 
   Communication – – 4 0.0 – – 0.04 0.00 
Financial intermediation 1 58 123 101 0.18 1.81 1.34 0.46 
Real estate and business activities 3 210 23 1 419 0.54 6.55 0.25 6.50 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 
– – – – – – – – 
Education – – – – – – – – 
Health and social work – – – 0.0 – – – 0.00 
Other community, social and personal 
service activities 
8 0.0 – 1 1.43 0.00 – 0.00 
Source: Rosstat (2009) and own calculations. 
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Table 5b. Sectoral distribution of Russian FDI outflows, according to Rosstat, 2010–2013 (millions of 
dollars and per cent) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013 
mln USD % 
Total 10 271 19 040 17 426 76 265 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.0 44 24 2 0.00 0.23 0.14 0.00 
Fishing, fish farming – – 0.0 10 – – 0.00 0.01 
Mining and quarrying 325 599 2 749 1 937 3.16 3.15 15.78 2.54 
   Mining and quarrying of energy 
   producing materials 
324 150 18 28 3.15 0.79 0.10 0.04 
      Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of 
      peat 
321 – – – 3.13 – – – 
      Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of 
      peat 
3 150 18 28 0.03 0.79 0.10 0.04 
   Mining and quarrying, except of energy 
   producing materials 
1 449 2 731 1 909 0.01 2.36 15.67 2.50 
Manufacturing 1 218 2 974 5 795 59 338 11.86 15.62 33.25 77.81 
   Manufacture of food products,  
   beverages and tobacco 
49 701 399 1 118 0.48 3.68 2.29 1.47 
   Manufacture of textiles and textile  
   products 
– – – – – – – – 
   Manufacture of leather and leather  
   products 
– – – – – – – – 
   Manufacture of wood and wood products – – – – – – – – 
   Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper  
   products; publishing and printing 
41 6 2 2 0.40 0.03 0.01 0.00 
   Manufacture of coke and refined  
   petroleum products 
237 7 – 53 670 2.31 0.04 – 70.37 
   Manufacture of chemicals and chemical  
   products 
39 95 1 212 1 003 0.38 0.50 6.96 1.32 
   Manufacture of rubber and plastic  
   products 
5 2 13 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.00 
   Manufacture of other non-metallic  
   mineral products 
8 1 6 1 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.00 
   Manufacture of basic metals and  
   fabricated metal products 
649 2 105 4 051 3 499 6.32 11.06 23.25 4.59 
   Manufacture of machinery and equip. 172 15 101 37 1.67 0.08 0.58 0.05 
   Manufacture of electrical and optical  
   equipment 
2 4 10 6 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 
   Manufacture of transport equipment 16 38 0.0 1 0.16 0.20 0.00 0.00 
Electricity, gas and water supply 147 – 39 67 1.43 – 0.22 0.09 
Construction 25 4 0.4 2 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal 
and household goods 
7 333 8 207 5 641 12 250 71.40 43.10 32.37 16.06 
Hotels and restaurants – 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.00 – 0.00 
Transport and communication 1 072 5 152 1 162 1 644 10.44 27.06 6.67 2.16 
   Telecommunications 935 5 107 1 160 1 638 9.10 26.82 6.66 2.15 
Financial intermediation 10 283 813 248 0.10 1.49 4.67 0.33 
Real estate, renting and business activities 141 1 777 1 201 766 1.37 9.33 6.89 1.00 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 
– – – – – – – – 
Education – – – – – – – – 
Health and social work – – – 1 – – – 0.00 
Other community, social and personal  
service activities 
– – 2 – – – 0.01 – 
Source: Rosstat (2014b) and own calculations. 
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Table 6. Sectoral breakdown of foreign assets of the top 20 or 25 Russian multinationals ranked by foreign 
assets, end of period, 2004–2011 (per cent) 
Skolkovo Top 25 2004 2005 2006 2007 IMEMO Top 20 2008 2009 2011 
Oil and gas 62 56 53 44 Oil and gas 39.8 45.8 51.0 
Metals and mining 13 23 26 36 Steel and non-ferrous metals 32.9 35.9 36.4 
    Steel  29,7 25,6 
   Non-ferrous metals  6,2 10,8 
Conglomerates 15,7 6,8  
Telecom 7 8 8 8  
Transport 14 10 8 8 Transport  5.1 5.9 
Other 4 3 5 4 Other 11.6 6.4 6.6 
Source: Own compilation based on Skolkovo (2007a: 10; 2007b: 6; 2008: 8), IMEMO (2009: 15; 2011: 22) 
and Kuznetsov (2013a: 19). 
 
communication and IT (19.7%) and finance (12.9%). Over the last eight years, ferrous 
metals have witnessed the most noticeable decline in their share of the Russian FDI 
stock (EABR, 2017: 22). 
 
2.4. The motives of Russian OFDI investors 
 
2.4.1. Russian OFDI and theorems 
Russian multinationals challenge some of the premises of traditional FDI theorems 
(Kalotay, 2008a: 59–60; 2008b: 99–103; Kalotay and Sulstarova, 2010: 136–138; Kalotay 
et al., 2014, 2015, 2016). The Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson paradigm (Heckscher, 1919; 
Ohlin, 1933; Samuelson, 1948, 1949) faces a major difficulty in explaining Russia as a top 
FDI exporter because of the paradigm’s aggregate macroeconomic approach. Similarly, 
aggregation and uniform thresholds make Dunning’s (1981) investment development 
path (IDP) problematic as it hypothesizes an association between GDP per capita and 
net OFDI position. The Uppsala School’s stages theory (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990; 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) suffers due to (1) the leapfrogging expansion of 
Russian firms, (2) the fact that they are mostly natural-resource-based giants, and (3) 
that acquisitions are prevalent. In the case of acquisitions, the partial lack of ownership 
advantages is compensated by the expertise found in the target firm. Naturally, one can 
find technology-based Russian firms and greenfield FDI projects. Nonetheless, the 
process of the internationalization of these companies is much more in line with the 
theories of either born-global firms (Knight and Cavusgil, 1996; Madsen and Servais, 
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1997) or international new ventures (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994) (for further 
discussion, see Kalotay et al., 2015: 573–575). 
In contrast, Dunning’s (1977; 1979: 275–276) eclectic paradigm or Ownership–
Location–Internalisation (OLI) of international production can, in principle, fit Russian 
multinationals better. As Eden and Dai (2010: 28) put it, “O” describes why firms are 
engaged in international production; “L” explains where they have gone; and “I”, how 
they have organized their international activities. Dunning (1983: 334) differentiates 
between asset power (later termed asset-based ownership-specific advantages, Oa) and 
transaction power (later termed transaction-based ownership-specific advantages, Ot). 
Transactional advantages were thought to also include the parent company’s 
interactions with domestic business and the public environment. This assumption may 
be legitimate in developed countries, but it could hardly be tenable for multinationals 
from countries such as China or Russia (Kalotay, 2009: 383). In the meantime, revising 
the OLI framework, Dunning and Lundan (2008: 101–102) added a third type of 
ownership advantage to the paradigm, i.e. institutional assets or institutional ownership 
advantages (Oi), drawing substantially on the work of Douglass North (e.g., see North, 
1990). Institutional ownership advantages also incorporate an imprint of the home 
country’s institutional environment (“L” attributes) (Cantwell at al., 2010: 572). 
However, according to Kalotay (2008a: 60; 2008b: 103), with the incorporation of 
institutions and institutional factors as lead components of the locational advantages, 
the theory became one-sided as it considers the role of institutions in the host countries, 
but not in the home countries. Hence, Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010: 137–138), following 
Kalotay (2008a: 60; 2008b: 102–103), recommend the extension of the OLI theorem by 
adding a home-country (H) leg to OLIH. Similarly, Anwar and Mughal (2014: 15) argue 
that Russian OFDI follows the eclectic paradigm to a certain extent, but home-country 
factors also play a significant role. Likewise, in the case of BRIC countries, Bulatov et al. 
(2016: 419) suggest analyses of the economic and political models of the home 
countries. Kalotay (2010b: 41) claims that home-country advantages play a similar role 
as ownership advantages. Moreover, home-country advantages may be the single most 
important factor in terms of OFDI from Russia. 
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2.4.2. Pull factors driving Russian OFDI 
According to Liuhto (2015a: 11–13), the top 10 motives behind Russian companies 
investing outward are as follows: (1) OFDI as a personal bank (more convenience in 
executing financial operations when part of the funds are abroad), (2) market entry and 
expansion (moving closer to the final consumers), (3) raising profit margins (moving 
along the value chain from an exporter of raw materials to a seller of final goods), (4) tax 
planning and minimization of customs fees (tax havens and low tax countries), (5) risk 
aversion (perceived political risk of the home market), (6) securing a company’s 
logistical chain (acquiring logistical units abroad to secure the exports of commodities 
from the domestic production site), (7) acquisition of advanced Western technology, (8) 
serving Russia’s foreign policy objectives, (9) acquisition of real estate or the 
establishment of a firm abroad in order to get a “Golden Visa” (the motive, detected at 
many Russian small and medium-sized enterprises, to get a long-term residence permit 
abroad or even foreign citizenship) and (10) a necessity driven by increasing global 
competition (the constraints of the domestic market push a firm to internationalize). 
This list includes both pull and push factors. 
Domestic push and international pull factors are equally important when examining 
the motives behind Russian OFDI. As already discussed, an exodus is caused by negative 
domestic push factors, while expansion might be related to either international pull or 
positive domestic push factors. Thus, while exodus refers to a negative phenomenon 
(see Kalotay, 2010a: 125–126; 2010b: 46, and Panibratov, 2013: 8), the effect of the 
home country is not necessarily negative.  
As widely known, borrowing and extending Behrman’s (1972) earlier taxonomy, 
Dunning (1993) identifies four types of multinational activity: market-seeking (import-
substituting or demand-oriented FDI), resource-seeking (supply-oriented FDI), 
efficiency-seeking (rationalised FDI) and strategic-asset- or capability-seeking. We refer 
to these as pull factors.14 In general, motives behind Russian OFDI are typically 
resource-seeking and market-seeking. Strategic-asset-seeking FDI is also there, and is 
especially a motive present among Russian machinery companies outside the top 20 
Russian multinationals (Kuznetsov, 2013a: 3). However, this statement applies to 
strategic-asset-seeking FDI in a narrow sense, since this term can also be used in a wider 
                                                 
14 As this paper is dealing with push factors, we only briefly review pull factors here. 
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sense. According to Kalotay, the definition of strategic-asset-seeking FDI is not entirely 
clear. By creating this category, Dunning originally meant acquisition of companies with 
high technology (firm-specific) content. Later on, it received a wider interpretation 
(Kálmán Kalotay, personal communication, 2 November 2015). That is why UNCTAD 
(2005: 8) mentions acquisitions by the former Yukos in Lithuania’s Mažeikių Nafta oil 
refinery and in Slovakia‘s Transpetrol crude oil transporter as strategic-asset-seeking 
FDI. Following this wider approach, investment in the trans-Baltic Sea Nord Stream 
pipeline between Russia and Germany can also be considered in this category. 
Controlling the pipelines and terminals, i.e. the transport infrastructure secures export 
deliveries and minimizes costs (Weiner, 2006: 7). Kuznetsov is still following the 
traditional (narrow) approach and claims that in a purely economic sense, FDI in 
infrastructure is either of the market-seeking (i.e. to meet the aim of access to markets) 
or efficiency-seeking type (in the case of the reduction of transportation costs) (Alexey 
Kuznetsov, personal communication, 4 December 2015). Obtaining new technology and 
management know-how is still an important motivation (Fortescue and Hanson, 2015: 
285), though Panibratov (2014) claims that emerging-market multinationals are no 
longer characterized by obsolete technologies and poor management. In fact, they 
compete successfully with their international counterparts and are becoming more 
powerful on the global scene, as Panibratov (2014) adds. Nonetheless, Fortescue and 
Hanson (2015: 297) illustrate with examples that technology and know-how transfer 
plays a major role in the foreign expansion of Russian steel multinationals. According to 
Kuznetsov (2013a: 4), efficiency-seeking FDI is more typical for medium-sized Russian 
multinationals. Kalotay (2015a: 249, 254) highlights that when Russian multinationals 
target upstream markets such as exploration and production, then – unlike other 
emerging-market investors (such as Chinese or Indian multinationals) – the motivation 
is typically not about ensuring resources for the home market; rather, they aim to 
control the value chain globally (i.e. the global markets), especially in developed 
countries. Kalotay (2015a: 249) also stresses that when they acquire companies in their 
own industry, their main aim is horizontal control (market power). This horizontal 
control is important not only in the resource-based industries, but also in 
telecommunications. Finally, image-building and aspirations for better global 
recognition is also decisive in Russian expansion (Panibratov and Kalotay, 2009: 3). 
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2.4.3. Push factors driving Russian OFDI 
Kalotay (2010b: 40) divides home-country advantages into the following four groups: 
home-country-based competitive advantages (Hc), business-environment advantages 
(Hb), development-strategy advantages (Hd) and state-involvement advantages (Hs). 
Russian OFDI has substantially relied on oligopolistic advantages, arising from 
dominant positions in the home market.15 These advantages have then often been 
supported by home-country policies, promoting the formation of national champions. 
Home-country-based competitive advantages should be treated in combination with the 
traditional transaction-based ownership-specific advantages, i.e. some of the former 
transactional ownership advantages may need to be reclassified to home-country 
competitive advantages (Kalotay, 2010b: 40, 42, 45). 
The home-country business environment can be either an advantage or a 
disadvantage for the company. As a positive effect (an advantage, i.e. a positive domestic 
push factor), one can refer to an expansion, while in a bad business environment (a 
disadvantage, i.e. a negative domestic push factor) an exodus is experienced.16 Up until 
recently, exoduses have been predominant (Kalotay, 2010b: 42, 46).17 Exoduses were 
strong in the early 1990s (at the beginning of the transition), and decreased in the mid-
1990s. The 1998 Russian crisis caused another rise in capital flight, followed again by 
normalization. Similarly, the crises of 2008–2009 and 2014–2016 increased the 
motivation of exodus capital (Panibratov, 2014; Kalotay, 2015b: 5–6). However, 
examining the largest cross-border outward mergers and acquisitions by Russian 
multinationals, Kalotay (2015a: 254) states that these firms have already left behind the 
phase of defensive, system-escape motives. Rather, in their majority, they follow 
genuinely offensive strategies, i.e. expansion. 
For the Russian case, the concept (and not the expression) “system escape” is known 
from Bulatov (1998: 77–79, 81). Bulatov adapted this from Svetličič et al. (1994), who 
                                                 
15 Notwithstanding, because of the high monopolization or oligopolization of the Russian economy, the 
cost of entry to many Russian industries is high for mid-sized local companies not affiliated with regional 
or federal authorities. Thus, this barrier often prompts them to go abroad (Bulatov, 2017: 84–85). 
16 In this paper, we will not elaborate on the problems of the Russian business environment repeated by 
yearly competitiveness reports. We only add that due to a bad business environment, Russian firms 
possess the firm-specific ownership advantages of good organizational abilities or technical expertise to 
operate under such circumstances which can be used abroad if facing similar situations (Antalóczy et al., 
2014: 7; Kalotay, 2015a). 
17 Naturally, in this paper, we only focus on capital in the form of FDI. 
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originally used this for pre-transition former Yugoslavia (Kalotay, 2005: 212). Fortescue 
and Hanson (2015: 284) consider escape a kind of political motivation. They separate 
two types of political motivation: of the Yukos and of the Gazprom type. In the case of 
Yukos motivation, companies invest abroad as a form of capital flight in order to escape 
a predatory state. This political motivation can be matched with exodus. The so-called 
Gazprom motivation is quite different. In this case, according to the authors, companies 
invest abroad because it suits the state’s foreign-policy goals that they do so. There is a 
serious debate about this issue, i.e. the nature and magnitude of the role of foreign-
policy goals. Otherwise, while Yukos motivation functions as a negative domestic push 
factor, Gazprom motivation can be considered a positive domestic push. 
Dunning (1993: 61–63) claims that besides his four well-known pull motives, there 
are three other types of investment: escape investment, support investment and passive 
investment. In the case of escape investment, OFDI is made to escape restrictive 
legislation or macro-organisational policies by home governments. This category does 
not include flight capital which may be associated with war, civil strife and dire 
economic circumstances. Rather, it involves round-tripping to exploit incentives to 
foreign investors; relocation of headquarters to escape high taxation levels and/or lack 
of dynamism in the domestic economy; and relocation of an environmentally sensitive 
sector. 
In transition economies, home-country development-strategy advantages are linked 
to the methods and strategies that were applied during the transformation. In Russia, 
these were based on the building up of national champions, a sustained resistance to 
IFDI, especially in strategic industries, and an increasing emphasis on promoting OFDI 
(Kalotay, 2010b: 46). Similarly to the business environment, the development strategy 
can also be either a positive or a negative domestic push factor. It is negative if the 
development strategy is misleading or unsuccessful.18 
In transition economies, state-involvement advantages are related to (1) government 
policies towards OFDI and (2) state ownership in outward investing firms. Regarding 
the former, the shift from reservation through acceptance towards some kind of 
promotion came later in Russia. As to the latter, a tendency towards more state 
ownership and intervention can clearly be observed (Kalotay, 2010b: 47–48). 
                                                 
18 Kálmán Kalotay drew our attention to this case (personal communication, 9 July 2015). 
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In contrast to the business environment and development strategy, it is difficult to 
imagine a negative domestic push factor regarding the home-country competitive 
environment and state involvement. In the case of state involvement, disadvantages that 
may be experienced while expanding abroad should not be confused with a negative 
domestic push factor. As one will see below in Section 2.4.3.1, state ownership can be 
either an advantage or a disadvantage in the host country when it comes to foreign 
expansion (Kalotay, 2010b: 48). Finally, with regard to the competitive environment 
within the home country, if a given company is expanding abroad by exploiting the 
competitive advantages gained on the domestic market and also by extending the 
domestic competition to foreign markets, then the positive domestic push factor is 
accompanied by expansion. 
 
2.4.3.1. A positive domestic push factor: the Russian state’s role in promoting foreign 
expansion 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the Russian government has increasingly started to 
look at outward foreign investment more favourably (Skolkovo, 2009: 6). The 
government was very cautious for a long time. It was unable to understand the 
fundamental difference between capital drain and FDI into production assets. Vagit 
Alekperov, the leader and a co-owner of Lukoil, continued to stress as late as in 2003 
that they were often criticized for spending a lot on foreign upstream and downstream 
assets, but they would not change that strategy. Moreover, he claimed that because of 
global competition and without government support, OFDI was becoming more and 
more difficult, adding that, on the other hand, they had recently started to feel the 
support of the state (Deloitte, 2008: 36). 
After a strong resistance to capital flight, state leaders have come to show their 
support for OFDI (Skolkovo, 2009: 6). Russia has recognized the need to support those 
multinationals whose capital exports contribute to the growth of the international 
competitiveness of the Russian economy (Kuznetsov, 2013b: 93). The first real sign of 
this change at the level of state policy was President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 11th 
St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2007, where he said they were 
interested in increasing Russian investment abroad and swapping assets with 
international partners on mutually beneficial terms (Deloitte, 2008: 36). The first time 
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Dmitry Medvedev (then first deputy prime minister) spoke about this issue was the 
speech in Krasnodar in January 2008. He urged Russian companies to copy the Chinese 
way. According to Medvedev, this would reduce dependence on foreign technology, 
boost production culture, grant the opportunity to diversify investments and win new 
markets. In addition, Medvedev, who at that time was also the chairman of Gazprom’s 
board of directors, responded to the resistance to Russian investments in Europe, saying 
that this was no reason for hysteria and they should quietly and measuredly forward 
their interests and convince people that investments from Russia were effective, 
transparent and necessary for the given countries (Belton, 2008; Medvedev, 2008a). In 
his speech at the 5th Krasnoyarsk Economic Forum in February 2008, Medvedev 
underlined the need to significantly increase the means of supporting Russian exports 
and outward foreign investment as well as the image of Russian business abroad 
(Medvedev, 2008b).19 In contrast, however, in October 2009, Medvedev adopted a 
somewhat different tone, expressing concern over outward foreign investment at a time 
when the domestic economy was in trouble (Fortescue and Hanson, 2015: 295; 
Medvedev, 2009). According to Fortescue and Hanson (2015: 295), Medvedev’s concerns 
were probably fuelled by fear of the political and social consequences of domestic 
closures and redundancies. However, when Medvedev (as prime minister) offered 
financial help to Russian steel producers in December 2013, there was no sign of 
negative governmental attitudes towards foreign assets (Fortescue and Hanson, 2015: 
295; Petlevoy, 2013). Referring to Helmer (2013), Fortescue and Hanson (2015: 295) 
argue that the negative attitude regarding OFDI has been maintained by Putin, including 
blocking some foreign projects. Nonetheless, Putin’s deoffshorisation campaign is about 
something else. In his Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly20 in December 2012, 
he emphasized the role of offshore investments and ownership in Russia and the 
phenomenon of fleeing from jurisdiction (Putin, 2012). In his Presidential Address in 
late 2013, Putin stated that no government assistance and contracts could be offered to 
companies that were registered in foreign jurisdictions and whose owners (their final 
beneficiaries) were Russians (Fortescue and Hanson, 2015: 295; Putin, 2013). Finally, in 
                                                 
19 Medvedev (as a president) paid an official visit to Africa for the first time in June 2009. The four-day 
visit in Egypt, Nigeria, Angola and Namibia, with a large number of Russian public and private business 
representatives, had been the most comprehensive ever by any Russian head of state to Africa. The role of 
the Russian multinationals was quite obvious (Freemantle and Stevens, 2009: 1). 
20 Federal Assembly of Russia, the parliament includes the lower house (State Duma) and the upper house 
(Federation Council). 
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his Presidential Address at the end of 2014, Putin proposed amnesty for capital 
returning to Russia (Putin, 2014). Therefore, this campaign is not directed to outward 
FDI but is targeting the ownership of Russian assets or assets with a Russian beneficial 
owner in foreign jurisdictions. Rather, the focus is on taxation – both from the points of 
view of the Russian oligarchs and Putin (Fortescue and Hanson, 2015: 296). As 
mentioned, the new Russian anti-offshore law has been effective since 2015. 
Nevertheless, unlike China, there is no specific going-global strategy in Russia 
(Nestmann and Orlova, 2008: 2). Contrary to the Chinese case, Russian outward 
expansion is mainly driven by private companies (Skolkovo, 2009: 6; Weiner, 2011: 283). 
As noted above, the list of top 20 Russian non-financial multinationals includes both 
state-controlled and privately owned companies (Table 3). Panibratov (2017a: 44) 
argues that state support for Russian multinationals is quite weak due to the lack of 
developed policy instruments.21 An example for such state support is, nonetheless, the 
Russian Agency for Export Credit and Investment Insurance (EXIAR), Russia’s first-ever 
such agency, assisting multinationals with export credits and OFDI, which was, however, 
only founded in late 2011 (Panibratov, 2017a: 44; EXIAR, n.d.). In 2013, EXIAR launched 
a program to insure Russian outward investment against non-commercial risks 
(Kuznetsov, 2014a: 130). Here, one can also mention that Russian embassies regularly 
provide crucial information for Russian companies to establish initial contacts with 
foreign companies (Panibratov, 2017a: 43). Additionally, in a broader sense, the Russia-
initiated regional integration (the Eurasian Customs Union and later the Eurasian 
Economic Union) is a rare example of government measures that promotes 
comprehensive support for Russian OFDI. Outside the CIS, the Russian government 
supports and protects only a few dozen Russian multinationals. Although in 2011 and 
2012, there were signs of shifts in discussions among experts and politicians on 
increased assistance for a broader range of Russian multinationals, real incentives are 
still lacking for Russian medium-sized multinationals to engage in OFDI (Kuznetsov, 
2013a: 9–10). 
Government involvement can be either an advantage or a disadvantage, but it is an 
important determinant of the success of internationalization (Panibratov, 2014). State-
owned companies enjoy many advantages that can help their internationalization. Such 
                                                 
21 Elsewhere Panibratov (2017b: 285) claims that the government policies towards OFDI are not clear yet. 
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benefits include financial capabilities, access to loans and administrative support 
(Panibratov and Kalotay, 2009: 3). During a crisis, state-controlled companies have a 
greater chance of securing the necessary funding for their expansion. Good diplomatic 
relations can also be used when expanding abroad. State ownership can offer a kind of 
guarantee when participating in a risky project and during a crisis. On the other hand, it 
in itself can be a disadvantage when expanding into other states, and, in particular, it 
may have a negative impact during international political conflicts. Also, furthering the 
state’s interests at the expense of business considerations can be harmful to profits 
(Kalotay, 2010a: 125; 2010b: 48). However, according to Panibratov (2014), the 
influence of the Russian state on fully or partially privatized companies is also often 
significant. Kalotay (2015a: 254) also emphasizes that the role of the state in influencing 
the strategies is not limited to companies with a controlling stake. State influence can 
also be enormous on companies without state ownership. This was evident in the case of 
companies that were bailed out during the 2008–2009 crisis. The state wished to ensure 
that the momentum of foreign expansion would be maintained or even accelerated, 
though commercial logic would have dictated the opposite. This is also apparent in the 
case of the acquisition of assets that give the Russian government an important strategic 
advantage. Naturally, state ownership and influence is not a Russian phenomenon per se. 
This is evident in the case of the foreign expansion of Chinese companies, as well as 
those from smaller countries, such as Kazakhstan, the Czech Republic or even Venezuela 
(Kalotay, 2015a: 255). 
Although the influence of the government on Russian OFDI is undoubtedly 
considerable, its effects vary by firms and sectors (Panibratov and Latukha, 2014). When 
assessing the role of the state, the two most important dimensions are control 
(ownership share and participation in the board of directors) and interest (basically, 
incentives to companies). There are sectors that are of maximum interest to the state 
and are under strong state control (such as oil and gas, electricity, mining and defence). 
Having strategic significance, these are both politically and economically important to 
the government. At the other extreme, there are sectors, such as the automotive, 
construction, fast food and logistics industries, the importance of which is relatively 
minimal (i.e. relatively both insignificant economically to the state and politically 
insensitive) and they do not require significant control, with the exception of some 
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regionally significant employers (such as the Lada car manufacturer AvtoVAZ in 
Togliatti or the other well-known Russian vehicle manufacturer GAZ in Nizhny 
Novgorod). Therefore, the state is rather indifferent to these sectors. This, nevertheless, 
does not mean that these would not be useful to the economy as a whole. They are very 
important to people, but not to the government in this respect. So, there must be a 
distinction between national and government priorities. In contrast, the state is 
interested in metallurgy, banking, telecommunications and IT because of the high 
economic output, but is not really motivated to control them. Finally, media, education 
and sports are not economically important (at least directly), but are under state control 
because the state intends to manage these sectors (such as the media) and seeks to 
provide incentives to voters. Nonetheless, the role of the state in the expansion of 
Russian companies is, on the one hand, overestimated (in the case of natural-resource-
based sectors) and, at the same time, underrated (in the case of the relatively small 
companies in less resource-oriented sectors) (Panibratov and Latukha, 2014; 
Panibratov, 2013, 2014). According to Panibratov (2013: 14; 2014) and Panibratov and 
Latukha (2014: 19), the state’s interest focuses on the expansion of two types of Russian 
multinationals: those where the business itself requires strict control (such as in the 
case of nuclear energy) and where foreign policy necessitates it (such as in defence).22 
In explaining the relationship between Russian OFDI and Russia’s government 
policies, Liuhto and Vahtra (2007: 117, 127–130) identified four categories of companies 
based on the variables of state control and the transparency and disclosure index. Thus, 
indirect state control measures (state leverage) were not considered. Among the four 
types, Non-transparent Patriots are large state-controlled companies with low 
transparency also serving the interests of Russia’s foreign policy. Transparent Patriots 
refer to large and transparent state-controlled companies with (a level of) conformity to 
state policy. The Non-transparent Independents category comprises privately-owned 
companies with a relatively low level of transparency. And, finally, Transparent 
Independents consist of private companies with transparent and business-oriented 
internationalization strategies that are not particularly influenced by political 
considerations. For example, at that time, Lukoil was categorized as a transparent 
                                                 
22 It is interesting that the author does not even mention the gas sector, while perhaps the biggest foreign 
concern is centred around it. For example, South Stream – aimed at running under the Black Sea to 
Bulgaria and then onwards – was clearly Putin’s gas pipeline project. 
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independent. However, according to Panibratov (2017a: 43), there is governmental 
pressure on Lukoil to invest more in Kazakhstan rather than in other countries. 
Similarly, Liuhto (2015a: 12) claims that perhaps Russia’s foreign policy would have 
played a certain role in Lukoil’s decision to invest in war-torn Iraq in 2009 (Liuhto, 
2015a: 12). Meanwhile, Kuznetsov (2013a: 5) argues that, although some natural-
resource-based private companies are politically linked to the Kremlin by personal 
contacts, their foreign activity is rarely affected by Russian economic diplomacy. 
Similarly, regarding the largest Russian steel producers, Fortescue and Hanson (2015: 
296) do not see any indication of intentions to serve Russia’s foreign policy. Likewise, 
through extensive research into this area, Tepavcevic (2013: 206–207) finds that 
business interests prevail over Russian national interests in most instances of Russian 
OFDI. Russian companies do not follow the official Russian foreign policy reflecting 
broader national interests. Moreover, some Russian multinationals pursue the 
individual interests of private company owners, Russian politicians and top managers of 
state-owned multinationals. 
 
 
3. The role of the EU in Russian OFDI and the expansion of Russian 
multinationals 
 
According to Kuznetsov (2011a: 11), on the eve of the global financial crisis of 2008–
2009 and with the development of Russian multinationals, Russian companies have 
shifted their focus from Europe to other regions, as illustrated by the statistics on 
mergers and acquisitions. The geographic distribution of foreign assets of the largest 
Russian multinationals also suggests a constantly decreasing share in Europe (Table 7) 
(Skolkovo, 2007a: 12; 2007b: 8; 2008: 10; IMEMO, 2009: 16; 2011: 24; Kuznetsov, 2013a: 
15). Principally, this has long meant the increasing role of North America. Asia and 
Africa have also received growing attention. The latter fits into the overall logic of 
Russian internationalization and is weakly influenced by the foreign political events of  
 
 
- 29 - 
Csaba Weiner / International expansion of Russian multinationals 
 
 
Table 7. Geographical distribution of foreign assets of the largest Russian multinationals, end of period, 
2006–2011 (per cent) 
Skolkovo Top 25 2006 2007 IMEMO Top 20 2008 2009 2011 
Western Europe 52 42 Western and Central Europe 49 46a 39a 
Eastern Europe 11 10  
CIS 22 18 CIS 23 22b 28b 
Africa 4 11 Africa 7 9 9 
    North Africa and the Middle East  1c 3c 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  8d 6d 
Asia and Australia 3 9 Asia and Australia 4 4 6 
    East Asia and the Pacifice  2 4 
   South Asiaf  1 1 
   Developed Asia and the Pacificg  1 1 
North America 6 9 North Americah 17 19 17 
Latin America 2 1 Latin America and the Caribbeani 0 0 1 
a Europe – Turkey and the CIS (“other Europe”). 
b Also including Ukraine and Georgia (“Eastern Europe and Central Asia”). 
c Also including Turkey. 
d Western and South Africa. 
e At the end of 2008: Mongolia, China, South Korea, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. At the end of 2009: 
Mongolia, China, South Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia. At the end of 2011: Mongolia, China and Vietnam. 
f At the end of 2008, 2009 and 2011: India. 
g At the end of 2008: Australia. At the end of 2009 and 2011: Australia, New Zealand and Japan. 
h Canada and the United States. 
i Also including Bermuda. 
Source: Own compilation based on Skolkovo (2007a: 12; 2007b: 8; 2008: 10), IMEMO (2009: 16; 2011: 24) 
and Kuznetsov (2013a: 15). 
 
the mid-2010s. However, a radical turn toward the East is impossible (Kuznetsov, 2017: 
79).23 Also, the recent increase in the share of some Asian countries has been due to the 
exit of a number of Russian investors from the United States and Ukraine, as well as a 
reduction in the weight of the Caribbean offshore world, rather than the devaluation of 
the role of the EU (Kuznetsov, 2017: 80). The decrease in the Russian FDI has been larger 
in Ukraine than in the United States (Bulatov et al., 2016: 409). According to Bulatov et 
al. (2016: 409), due to the Eurasian Economic Union, growth opportunities are greater 
in Belarus and Kazakhstan than in the US. There has been a strengthening of Russian 
investment presence in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (Kuznetsov, 2017: 
80). 
The gradual reduction of non-CIS Europe’s role in favour of North America (the 
increasing role of the US, however, as revealed above, has been stopped and reversed) 
and the developing countries has indicated the experience gained through foreign 
expansion and the evolution of Russian multinationals from regional and bi-regional to 
                                                 
23 The development of Russia’s Far East also plays an important role in Russia’s pivot to Asia. 
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real global ones (Kuznetsov, 2011a: 13).24 Russian multinationals typically begin their 
international expansion in other CIS countries (Panibratov, 2017a: 284). Based on 
Rugman and Verbeke (2008) and Sethi (2009), Panibratov (2010: 8) claims that almost 
all emerging multinationals evolve from a regional to a global one. Naturally, during 
their expansion, it is not just geographical distance that matters. Ghemawat’s (2001) 
CAGE Distance Framework highlights that cultural (C), administrative (A), geographical 
(G) and economic (E) distances increase transactions costs, thus promoting a home-
region bias (Sethi, 2009: 357). Annushkina and Colonel (2013: 58) find that the host 
country’s geographic closeness to Russia and its being a former Soviet republic or a tax 
haven positively affected the particular country’s probability of attracting a merger and 
acquisition or joint venture deal by a Russian multinational, while the similar level of 
economic development did not significantly influence the multinationals’ foreign market 
selection decisions. Analysing the mergers and acquisitions carried out by BRIC-country 
firms between 2000 and 2007, Sethi (2009: 361) concludes that Russian multinationals 
are the most home-region-bound among the BRIC economies, since 254 of their 339 
M&As were made in Europe.25 Although such detailed M&A statistics are not available 
after 2007, one can use the lists of the 10 largest M&A transactions of Russian 
multinationals announced between 2007 and 2009 and between 2009 and 2011, 
respectively. In both these cases, only two targeted the EU during each period: one in 
Italy and one in Hungary,26 as well as one in Germany and one in Luxembourg, 
accordingly.27 However, the Luxembourg-related transaction also included assets in the 
EU and the United States (IMEMO, 2011: 17; Kuznetsov, 2013a: 17). It should be noted 
that the statistics only take into account where the acquired company has been 
registered, rather than where its assets are located geographically. Moreover, they can 
                                                 
24 Rugman and Verbeke (2004) identified four types of multinationals: home-region-oriented, bi-regional, 
host-region-oriented and global multinationals. 
25 Asia had 46 M&As, but many of them were in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. 
Eight transactions were in Africa, three in Oceania and only one in Latin America (Sethi, 2009: 361).  
26 The Hungarian case ended in failure. Surgutneftegaz, Russia’s third-largest oil producer, sold the stake it 
bought in the Hungarian oil and gas company Mol in 2009 to the Hungarian government in 2011. It must 
be emphasized that between 2007 and 2009, not just the two mentioned, but a total of four transactions 
targeted the EU. The remaining two deals are, however, not included in our list because the respective 
assets are in fact in non-EU countries – assets were acquired in Ukraine via Cyprus, as well as in 
Kazakhstan via the Netherlands (IMEMO, 2011: 17). 
27 Between 2009 and 2011, another acquisition was linked to the EU, i.e. the above-mentioned transaction 
via the Netherlands, in which the assets were located in Kazakhstan (Kuznetsov, 2013a: 17). Note that 
because of Surgutneftegaz’s failure in Hungary, the list of top 10 outward M&A transactions between 2009 
and 2011 no longer included the Surgutneftegaz deal. 
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be located in many different regions. According to Kuznetsov (2011a: 11), EU countries 
are not very popular for greenfield investments. The major projects have been carried 
out in Asia (e.g. India, Vietnam and Turkey). Between 2009 and 2011, two of the five 
most significant foreign greenfield projects by Russians, i.e. Gazprom’s gas storage 
construction projects in Austria and Germany, targeted the EU (Kuznetsov, 2013a: 17).28 
UNCTAD (2017: 68) warns that projects in emerging economies do not allow Russian 
multinationals the same access to cutting-edge technologies as in traditional advanced 
countries. Thus, the decline in the share of developed European states can be regarded 
as a step backwards in terms of using the internationalization of Russian business to 
increase Russia’s competitiveness (Kuznetsov, 2011a: 13). 
 
3.1. The size of Russian FDI in the EU 
Eurostat and the CBR display very different data on the size of Russian FDI in the EU. 
Eurostat data until 2012 are reported in line with the BPM5 methodology. In contrast, 
figures for 2013–2016 are based on new methodological standards, i.e. BPM6 and the 4th 
edition of the OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (BMD4). Hence, 
data beginning in 2013 are not directly comparable with those referring to earlier years 
(Eurostat, 2017f). As mentioned, CBR statistics are consistent with the BPM6 
methodology. Differences in data are in large part a result of the activities of special-
purpose entities. EU aggregates include them, but national data does not necessarily do 
so (Eurostat, 2017f). This is why national data cannot be simply aggregated. The solution 
would be to provide data on the basis of the country of the ultimate investor. This is the 
direction in which statistics are heading, but it is not easy to credibly identify the 
ultimate owner. For example, Hungary’s central bank, the MNB, started publishing 
inward FDI positions calculated by the ultimate investor in 2016 (Weiner, 2017a: 195).29 
According to Eurostat (2016a), the figures of Russian FDI in the EU27 increased by 
13.5 times over eight years, from EUR 5.6 billion at the end of 2002 to EUR 75.2 billion at 
                                                 
28 The three other projects took place in Ukraine, the breakaway Abkhazia region of Georgia and 
Kazakhstan (Kuznetsov, 2013a: 17). 
29 While FDI statistics on the immediate owners use the 10 per cent threshold of ownership/voting power, 
FDI statistics on an ultimate investing country basis identify only one ultimate investor as the ultimate 
controlling parent of the resident company, and allocate all the foreign direct investment stocks to this 
one ultimate investor. 
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the end of 2012 (Table 8).30 By comparison, a simple accumulation of country data from 
the CBR suggests the size of Russian FDI in the EU27 amounted to USD 276.1 billion at 
the end of 2012, as compared to USD 197.0 billion at the end of 2009 (Table 9) (CBR, 
2017c).31 For end-2016, the CBR reported Russian FDI stock in the EU28 of USD 296.2 
billion (CBR, 2017c), while Eurostat gave the figure of EUR 84.9 billion (Eurostat, 
2017b).32 
Russian FDI is considered of less importance to the EU than vice versa. Likewise, in 
the case of bilateral trade in goods, Russia depends more on the EU than the EU on 
Russia. In 2016, 45.7 per cent of Russia’s exports went to the EU, while 38.3 per cent of 
its imports came from there (FTS, 2017). In contrast, in 2016, Russia bought only 4.1 per 
cent of EU exports and comprised 7.0 per cent of EU imports (Eurostat, 2017c: 2). 
However, Russia has an important or exclusive role regarding certain products in 
certain countries (Liuhto, 2015b: 79–81). 
According to Eurostat (2016a), Russia’s share in the IFDI stock of the EU27 from 
extra-EU27 sources reached only 1.93 per cent at the end of 2012 (Table 8), despite 
being the seventh largest FDI investor, following the United States, Switzerland, Japan, 
Canada, Norway and Brazil.33 Among the BRIC countries, Russia even overtook China 
(EUR 27.4 billion), if Hong Kong (EUR 50.7 billion) is not taken into account. However, 
this is still a remarkable increase because Russia’s share was only 0.35 per cent in 2004, 
and since then it has grown year by year (Eurostat, 2015). At the end of 2016, Russia’s 
share in the EU28’s total IFDI stock by extra-EU28 investing countries was 1.36 per cent 
(Eurostat, 2017b). In contrast, according to the CBR, the EU28’s share in Russia’s OFDI 
stock accounted for 67.5 per cent at the end of 2012 and 70.6 per cent at the end of 2016 
(Table 9) (CBR, 2017c).34 Nevertheless, the EU’s significance for Russia is incontestable, 
even if we exclude some of the trans-shipment transactions and all the cases of round-
tripping.35 
                                                 
30 The year 2012 is highlighted because, as noted, Eurostat introduced new methodology for collecting 
data starting in 2013. Data for special-purpose entities are available from 2013 onwards. 
31 CBR data are constructed according to the asset/liability principle (CBR, 2017c) rather than the 
directional principle (CBR, 2017e). 
32 Flow data are presented in Table A1 (Eurostat) and Table A2 (CBR) in the Appendix. 
33 Russia’s significance is greater in certain countries. 
34 The share of the EU has been around 65 per cent each year since 2009. 
35 Naturally, a very precise calculation of this aspect cannot be done. 
  
  Table 8. Russian FDI stock in the EU, according to Eurostat, end of period, 2004–2016 (millions of euros) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013a 2014a 2015a 2016a I 
(%) 
II 
(%) 
III 
(%) 
EU28 : : : : 30 021 46 937 50 375 56 947 75 345 50 006 
(22 062) 
50 563 
(9 117) 
76 186 
(33 203) 
84 942 
(38 970) 
100.00 1.36 0.60 
IV (%)          1.16 1.03 1.27 1.36     
V (%)          0.46 0.42 0.56 0.60    
EU27 5 570 12 117 14 578 24 591 29 967 46 859 50 263 56 793 75 190         
VI (%) 0.35 0.66 0.72 1.02 1.20 1.68 1.60 1.53 1.93         
VII (%) 0.11 0.21 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.72        
EU25 5 519 11 931 14 326 24 034 29 103 45 836 49 042 55 356 73 369         
EU15 3 714 8 373 11 636 20 114 21 925 26 962 27 576 33 446 46 138         
EU15 plus Cyprus and Malta  
Austria : 421 461 2 976 1 980 4 889 4 948 5 544 6 590 : : : : : : : 
Belgium : : : : 42 -1 007 -982 -825 -797 -1 262 
(-1 001) 
-704 
(-449) 
-185 
(-130) 
-81 
(-49) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Cyprus 439 745 902 1 189 1 585 1 377 1 116 1 472 2 198 24 275 15 769 30 324 31 133 36.65 48.97 16.40 
Denmark 35 63 165 90 109 152 134 298 531 6 68 
(5) 
89 102 0.12 0.27 0.09 
Finland 366 378 413 538 365 506 503 634 583 : : 830 986 1.16 14.86 1.29 
France 422 448 740 266 276 361 529 323 463 1 101 1 452 1 645 1 808 2.13 1.01 0.27 
Germany 918 1 031 3 486 3 477 4 305 2 593 2 878 3 156 3 197 2 842 3 587 3 881 4 361 5.13 2.06 0.58 
Greece 40 45 41 47 : : : 41 34 33 34 33 26 0.03 0.62 0.11 
Ireland -17 -38 -131 468 76 86 201 208 465 550 345 -27 358 0.42 0.07 0.04 
Italy 33 37 44 37 93 435 278 186 447 454 416 527 144 0.17 0.41 0.04 
Luxembourg : : : : : : : : : -43 339 -48 543 -35 809 -37 134 N/A N/A N/A 
Malta : 6 7 10 11 12 12 12 1 -1 -2 39 43 0.05 0.03 0.03 
Netherlands 93 117 40 240 304 347 328 445 558 44 205 
(43 287) 
45 943 
(44 155) 
43 913 
(42 615) 
50 289 
(48 524) 
59.20 2.52 1.30 
Portugal 0 0 3 5 14 16 42 51 62 74 102 123 
(2) 
147 
(2) 
0.17 : : 
Spain : 715 768 1 028 1 507 1 855 2 390 2 994 3 830 4 605 5 439 6 321 6 790 7.99 6.22 1.31 
Sweden -22 206 26 -66 -457 8 -249 -238 -183 225 169 107 175 0.21 0.27 0.06 
UK : : : 244 1 660 837 1 394 1 608 1 492 1 974 : : : : : : 
(continued on next page) 
  
  Table 8 (continued) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013a 2014a 2015a 2016a I 
(%) 
II 
(%) 
III 
(%) 
EU-member CEE countries (EU11) 
Bulgaria 49 179 248 522 792 1 005 1 175 1 424 1 741 1 820 
(1) 
1 982 1 930 1 952 2.30 20.70 4.90 
Croatia 12 10 24 86 54 78 112 154 155 188 255 287 302 0.36 9.07 1.15 
Estonia 144 179 252 290 395 407 494 540 691 764 828 647 686 0.81 22.62 3.73 
Latvia 235 346 380 348 370 367 334 389 487 565 1 053 1 188 1 316 1.55 36.39 9.78 
Lithuania 396 1 703 522 1 004 487 495 715 598 575 518 185 217 274 0.32 10.56 1.96 
Romania 2 7 4 35 72 17 46 13 79 62 36 42 139 0.16 2.09 0.20 
   of which five CEE countries  
Czech R. 57 46 90 104 169 242 300 242 311 413 448 675 613 0.72 5.04 0.55 
Hungary 95 -5 17 699 -209 1 130 1 521 -69 -97 -55 -13 -46 -47 N/A N/A N/A 
Poland 446 540 502 277 183 117 39 59 513 271 356 369 271 0.32 1.96 0.15 
Slovakia 3 1 12 -32 -55 -105 -183 -286 -233 -282 -309 -168 -204 N/A N/A N/A 
Slovenia -4 -3 2 29 36 55 74 35 47 79 63 62 73 0.09 3.68 0.56 
: Not available. 
N/A – Not applicable because of negative value. 
a Break in time series from 2013. 
I – As a share of total Russian FDI stock in the EU28 at the end of 2016. 
II – As a share of Russian FDI in the total IFDI stock by extra-EU28 investing countries in the respective EU member countries at  
the end of 2016. 
III – As a share of Russian FDI in the total IFDI stock of the respective EU member countries at the end of 2016. 
IV – As a share of Russian FDI in the EU28’s total IFDI stock by extra-EU28 investing countries at the end of the respective years. 
V – As a share of Russian FDI in the EU28’s total IFDI stock at the end of the respective years. 
VI – As a share of Russian FDI in the EU27’s total IFDI stock by extra-EU27 investing countries at the end of the respective years. 
VII – As a share of Russian FDI in the EU27’s total IFDI stock at the end of the respective years. 
Note: The value of stock held by special-purpose entities is in brackets where it is available and its value is different from 0.0. 
Source: Own compilation and calculations based on Eurostat (2015, 2016a, 2017b). 
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Table 9. Russian FDI stock in the EU, according to the CBR, based on asset/liability principle, end of 
period, 2009–2016 (millions of dollars) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 As a  
% of 
totala 
As a  
% of  
EU28b 
Total 298 357 361 121 361 750 409 567 479 501 411 270 367 593 419 453 100.0   
EU28c 197 197 243 553 232 749 276 502 308 126 290 619 258 849 296 232 70.6 100.0 
    as a % of totald 66.1 67.4 64.3 67.5 64.3 70.7 70.4 70.6   
CEEc 10 894 10 722 10 393 11 936 14 917 13 085 12 481 12 859 3.1 4.3 
    as a % of totald 3.7 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.1   
5 CEE countriesc 4 261 4 115 2 205 2 417 2 877 3 038 2 987 3 060 0.7 1.0 
    as a % of totald 1.4 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7   
EU15 plus Cyprus and Malta 
Austria 6 052 5 456 3 955 7 459 25 891 37 230 22 561 22 128 5.3 7.5 
Belgium 18 70 137 733 273 588 494 454 0.1 0.2 
Cyprus 115 898 149 530 125 355 151 322 163 066 125 701 112 362 150 547 35.9 50.8 
Denmark 92 85 406 627 1 330 1 103 1 321 1 671 0.4 0.6 
Finland 974 1 151 948 1 309 1 382 1 160 2 481 2 907 0.7 1.0 
France 1 339 1 562 1 768 3 287 3 666 3 462 2 890 2 880 0.7 1.0 
Germany 7 444 6 721 6 337 9 111 9 886 9 709 9 427 8 138 1.9 2.7 
Greece 471 742 499 558 571 661 631 685 0.2 0.2 
Ireland 661 1 285 1 848 2 541 2 732 2 700 3 320 5 445 1.3 1.8 
Italy 1 908 1 425 1 340 1 697 2 063 2 428 2 347 2 482 0.6 0.8 
Luxembourg 14 801 12 004 12 093 9 130 11 352 14 848 14 672 12 738 3.0 4.3 
Malta 34 35 38 90 76 98 97 99 0.0 0.0 
Netherlands 24 569 39 668 56 933 65 615 60 601 66 217 61 886 60 198 14.4 20.3 
Portugal 37 61 73 98 134 225 223 229 0.1 0.1 
Spain 3 059 3 553 3 115 3 722 4 783 6 285 6 294 6 329 1.5 2.1 
Sweden 880 1 404 436 841 97 133 161 225 0.1 0.1 
UK 10 341 10 278 10 058 10 045 9 192 8 809 8 311 9 557 2.3 3.2 
EU-member CEE countries (EU11) 
Bulgaria 1 586 1 884 2 439 2 854 2 863 3 143 3 247 3 256 0.8 1.1 
Croatia 206 226 250 355 398 394 385 390 0.1 0.1 
Estonia 589 149 220 276 400 459 490 469 0.1 0.2 
Latvia 535 473 704 941 3 046 1 881 1 931 2 010 0.5 0.7 
Lithuania 1 380 1 420 1 444 1 335 1 406 312 301 307 0.1 0.1 
Romania 63 258 147 138 36 34 29 30 0.0 0.0 
   of which five CEE countries 
Czech R. 1 336 1 192 1 309 1 598 1 844 1 968 1 896 1 894 0.5 0.6 
Hungary 2 266 2 230 228 107 237 280 230 264 0.1 0.1 
Poland 596 581 545 589 627 510 563 578 0.1 0.2 
Slovakia 48 52 59 78 97 117 127 129 0.0 0.0 
Slovenia 14 59 64 45 72 163 172 194 0.0 0.1 
Non-EU-member CEE countries 
Albania - - - - 2 5 5 5 0.0   
Bosnia and Herz. 541 678 561 725 875 938 576 616 0.1   
Macedonia - - - 1 1 4 4 5 0.0   
Montenegro 1 339 896 935 1 109 1 226 1 329 1 328 1 342 0.3   
Serbia 394 623 1 488 1 784 1 786 1 548 1 197 1 370 0.3   
a As a share of total Russian OFDI stock at the end of 2016. 
b As a share of total Russian FDI stock in the EU28 at the end of 2016. 
c Own calculations resulting from the simple accumulation of country data. 
d As a share of total Russian OFDI stock at the end of the respective years. 
Source: Own calculations based on CBR (2017c). 
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Russian OFDI could have been much larger in the EU. Many transactions have not 
been realized, not just because of business or regulatory reasons, but also because of 
political resistance to Russian FDI. An extreme case is when the Russian company or the 
state exerts pressure on companies to acquire them or punishes them in response to an 
unsuccessful acquisition. Such examples are known in Central and East European states 
(Weiner, 2006), which, however, cannot be regarded as commonly used Russian 
business practices. 
 
3.2. Geographical distribution of Russian FDI in the EU 
Stock data from Eurostat (2017b) show that at the end of 2016, the largest recipients 
of Russian FDI in the EU were the Netherlands, Cyprus, Spain and Germany. However, 
statistics also show that the bulk of Russian FDI stock in the Netherlands is held by 
special-purpose entities and the situation should be similar for Cyprus for which SPE 
data are not available (Table 8). Besides Cyprus (with 16.4 per cent), Russia secures the 
highest share of the IFDI stock in the three Baltic States (Latvia – 9.8%, Estonia – 3.7%, 
Lithuania – 2.0%) and Bulgaria (4.7%). Russia’s share is somewhat above one per cent 
in Spain, the Netherlands, Finland and Croatia. In other EU countries, it remains below 
one per cent. However, earlier data suggest that the role of Russian FDI is also notable in 
Austria, for which data are lacking. In addition, Astrov (2009) draws attention to an 
important phenomenon regarding non-FDI issues in Austria. Referring to unofficial 
sources, he argues that Austrian banks provide a safe haven for Russian capital, 
including that of Russian senior officials. Russian politicians and businessmen often visit 
Austrian banks when travelling there officially and for tourist purposes. Similarly as 
does the United Kingdom, Austria also offers asylum to certain Russian oligarchs. 
According to data from the CBR, Russian FDI stock at the end of 2016 was by far the 
largest in Cyprus (USD 150.5 billion), followed by the Netherlands (USD 60.2 billion), the 
British Virgin Islands (USD 42.1 billion) and Austria (USD 22.1 billion) (CBR, 2017c). 
Three of these four countries are EU members. By the end of 2016, 78.6 per cent of 
Russian FDI stock in the EU was accumulated in these three countries (Cyprus – 50.8%, 
the Netherlands – 20.3%, Austria – 7.5%) (Table 9). 
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In contrast, using a different methodology, IMEMO’s FDI project database gives a 
much more accurate picture than official data. Accordingly, at the end of 2016, the main 
destinations in non-CIS Eurasia were Italy, Germany, Great Britain, Turkey, Switzerland, 
Iraq and Bulgaria. This database shows minor Russian FDI stock in Cyprus (USD 0.05 
billion at the end of 2016). Likewise, real Russian FDI presence is much smaller in 
Luxembourg (USD 0.01 billion), Spain (USD 0.22 billion), Ireland (USD 0.56 billion), 
Latvia (USD 0.88 billion) and the Netherlands (USD 1.06 billion) than officially 
registered (EABR, 2017: 24).36 
CBR data (Table 9) suggest similar numbers for the CEE region to the ones Eurostat 
mentions above (Table 8). At the end of 2016, Bulgaria was the largest host country of 
Russian FDI stock within CEE at USD 3.3 billion, followed by Latvia (USD 2.0 billion), the 
Czech Republic (USD 1.9 billion), Serbia (USD 1.4 billion) and Montenegro (USD 1.3 
billion). The CEE region accounted for 3.1 per cent of the Russian OFDI stock (CBR, 
2017c). In contrast, again, IMEMO’s FDI project database helps build a more accurate 
picture. These data highlight that Russian FDI is underestimated in Bulgaria (USD 4.02 
billion vs. USD 3.26 billion at the end of 2016), Serbia (2.55 vs. 1.37), Romania (1.57 vs. 
0.03) and Poland (1.14 vs. 0.58) (EABR, 2017: 24). 
The preference to invest in neighbouring countries can be observed in the case of the 
three Baltic States. However, two factors limit the expansion of Russian companies in the 
wider Baltic Sea region. On the one hand, Russian companies face fierce competition 
from Swedish investors (in Finland and the three Baltic States) and German investors 
(mainly in Poland) and, on the other, political problems are also not negligible 
(Kuznetsov, 2012; 2014b: 63). Outside the former Soviet Union, the linguistic and 
cultural barriers are small in South-East Europe (Kuznetsov, 2011a: 5, 10; 2013b: 94). 
Eurostat’s (2017d) inward FATS data show that in 2014 3,534 Russian-controlled 
enterprises operated in the EU, compared to 265,000 foreign-controlled enterprises.37 
                                                 
36 Regarding the top 20 Russian non-financial multinationals ranked by foreign assets at the end of 2011, 
two old (Germany and Italy) and two new EU members (Bulgaria and Romania) were the most popular EU 
host countries (Kuznetsov, 2013a: 4). 
37 Eurostat’s Foreign AffiliaTes Statistics (FATS) are compiled according to the ultimate controlling 
institutional unit (UCI) concept. This means that the ultimate controlling institutional unit (enterprise, 
branch or natural person) is not controlled by another institutional unit. The words “subsidiary” and 
“affiliate” can be misleading because these Russian-controlled enterprises can be controlled by either 
natural persons or companies. As already emphasized, standard FDI statistics (reported according to the 
immediate owners) use the 10 per cent threshold of ownership/voting power, while FATS statistics are 
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According to this methodology, the majority of Russian-controlled enterprises were 
located in Central and Eastern Europe, including 946 in Latvia, 702 in Slovenia, 538 in 
Bulgaria and 331 in Croatia (Table A3 in the Appendix).38 The main sector for these 
companies is wholesale and retail trade (Table A4 in the Appendix) (Eurostat, 2017e). 
 
3.3. Industrial distribution of Russian OFDI in the EU 
According to Eurostat (2017b), the service sector accounted for 83.1 per cent of 
Russian FDI stock in the EU at the end of 2015 (Table 11). Between 2008 and 2010, the 
share of services was lower (Table 10) (Eurostat, 2016b). The electricity, gas, steam and 
air conditioning supply sector is the only other one worth mentioning. Foremost among 
service sectors are financial and insurance activities, though professional, scientific and 
technical activities play a notable role as well. Real estate activities and private real 
estate activities are also relatively important (Table 11). However, in our view, this gives 
a distorted picture due to special-purpose entities and transactions via third countries. 
Table 12 shows which sectors attracted the largest share of Russian FDI in each EU 
country (Eurostat, 2017b). Yet with knowledge of the largest Russian FDI deals in 
individual EU countries and whether these were carried out directly or indirectly, i.e. 
through a third country (indirect or direct FDI), one can conclude that not only FDI data 
of the individual countries but also their sectoral distribution well illustrate how 
seriously Russian FDI through third countries distorts statistical data. 
According to Kuznetsov (2010b: 28), Europe is one of the key regions of Russian FDI 
sectoral diversification. In the first place, one can highlight the present and former 
machinery assets of Renova and Sistema conglomerates, the heavy machinery producer 
OMZ (United Heavy Machinery Plants or Uralmash–Izhora Group) and the largest 
Russian tractor producer Traktorniye Zavody.39 Also, chemical companies (from 
fertilizer manufacturers to the leading Russian perfumery and cosmetics company 
Kalina), companies in the wood and paper industry (see, e.g., Investlesprom), various 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
based on the country of the ultimate controlling institutional unit, but do not report the value of the 
foreign investment stocks. 
38 These data, naturally, do not include all the companies with Russian involvement. 
39 Traktorniye Zavody went bankrupt. 
- 39 - 
Csaba Weiner / International expansion of Russian multinationals 
 
 
Table 10. Russian FDI stock in the EU, breakdown by economic activity (NACE Rev. 1.1 and NACE Rev. 2), 
according to Eurostat, end of period, 2005–2012 (millions of euros and per cent)  
 
NACE Rev. 1.1 NACE Rev. 2 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
All FDI activities (mln EUR) 12 117 14 578 24 591 29 967 46 859 29 967 46 859 50 263 56 793 75 190 
   All NACE activities (mln EUR)      28 112 42 306 47 402 53 331 71 733 
   Services (mln EUR) 8 823 12 158 21 590 14 184 27 112 14 135 27 509 29 551 48 987 66 411 
The share of services (%) 72.8 83.4 87.8 47.3 57.9 47.2 58.7 58.8 86.3 88.3 
Source: Eurostat (2013, 2016b). 
 
Table 11. Russian FDI stock in the EU, breakdown by economic activity (NACE Rev. 2), according to 
Eurostat, end of period, 2013–2015 (millions of euros and per cent) 
 2013 2014 2015 
mln EUR % mln EUR % mln EUR % 
All FDI activities 50 006 100.00 50 563 100.00 76 186 100.00 
All NACE activities 49 288 98.57 49 290 97.48 73 954 97.07 
A. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4 0.01 3 0.00 1 0.00 
B. Mining and quarrying 55 0.11 61 0.12 19 0.03 
C. Manufacturing -676 N/A 410 0.81 439 0.58 
D35. Electricity, gas, steam and air  
conditioning supply 
2 966 5.93 3 459 6.84 3 248 4.26 
E. Water supply; sewerage, waste  
management and remediation activities 
-3 N/A -23 N/A -27 N/A 
F. Construction 346 0.69 343 0.68 292 0.38 
G–U. Services 40 681 81.35 38 335 75.82 63 301 83.09 
   G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of  
   motor vehicles and motorcycles 
2 508 5.02 1 813 3.58 1 253 1.64 
   H. Transportation and storage 2 098 4.19 1 809 3.58 983 1.29 
   I. Accommodation and food service activities 247 0.49 329 0.65 306 0.40 
   J. Information and communication 72 0.14 19 0.04 116 0.15 
   K. Financial and insurance activities 20 179 40.35 14 124 27.93 40 481 53.13 
   L. Real estate activities 2 852 5.70 3 385 6.70 3 713 4.87 
   M. Professional, scientific and technical activities 12 114 24.22 16 233 32.10 16 091 21.12 
   N. Administrative and support service activities 564 1.13 585 1.16 339 0.44 
   O/T/U. Public administration; activities of  
   households and of extraterritorial organisations 
32 0.06 23 0.05 2 0.00 
   P85. Education 0 0.00 1 0.00 2 0.00 
   Q. Human health and social work activities 5 0.01 5 0.01 2 0.00 
   R. Arts, entertainment and recreation 7 0.01 4 0.01 7 0.01 
   S. Other service activities  1 0.00 7 0.01 10 0.01 
Private real estate activities 719 1.44 1 273 2.52 2 233 2.93 
Not allocated 5 913 11.83 6 704 13.26 6 680 8.77 
: Not available. 
N/A – Not applicable because of negative value. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2017b). 
  
Table 12. Russian FDI stock in the EU, breakdown by country and economic activity (NACE Rev. 2), according to Eurostat, at the end of  
2015 (millions of euros) 
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All FDI activities : -185 30 324 89 830 1 645 3 881 33 -27 527 -35 809 39 43 913 123 
All NACE activities : -185 30 324 89 : : 3 463 33 -27 437 : 39 43 913 123 
A. Agriculture, forestry and fishing : : 0 : 0 : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 
B. Mining and quarrying : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 
C. Manufacturing : : 0 : -66 -115 42 -3 -279 -53 : 0 1 076 0 
D35. Electricity, gas, steam and air  
conditioning supply 
: 0 0 0 : : : 1 0 0 : 0 0 0 
E. Water supply; sewerage, waste  
management and remediation activities 
: 0 0 0 0 : : 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 
F. Construction : 0 0 0 0 : -1 25 0 0 : 0 4 : 
G–U. Services : -4 30 324 10 41 1 764 484 10 252 491 : 39 42 833 : 
   G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of  
   motor vehicles and motorcycles 
: : : 5 -18 : 41 1 : 490 : 0 2 0 
   H. Transportation and storage : 0 : 1 : 192 312 0 0 -1 : : 1 0 
   I. Accommodation and food service activities : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 : 
   J. Information and communication : 0 : 5 : : : 0 -6 1 : 0 0 0 
   K. Financial and insurance activities : -150 29 657 -1 0 : -43 9 : 0 : 0 42 718 1 
   L. Real estate activities : 0 436 0 : 1 604 57 0 0 0 : : 112 : 
   M. Professional, scientific and technical activities : : : -1 0 : 128 0 0 0 : : 0 : 
   N. Administrative and support service activities : 0 0 0 0 : -29 0 360 0 : : 0 0 
   O/T/U. Public administration; activities of  
   households and of extraterritorial organisations 
: 0 1 1 : : 0 0 0 : : 0 0 : 
   P85. Education : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 
   Q. Human health and social work activities : 0 0 0 0 : : 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 
   R. Arts, entertainment and recreation : 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 0 : : 0 0 
   S. Other service activities  : 0 0 0 0 : 0 1 0 0 : 0 0 0 
Private real estate activities : 0 0 0 : : 419 0 0 89 : 0 0 0 
Not allocated : 0 0 4 : -2 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 93 
(continued on next page) 
  
  Table 12 (continued) 
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All FDI activities 6 321 107 : 1 930 287 647 1 188 217 42 675 -46 369 -168 62 
All NACE activities : 107 : 1 930 287 647 : 118 42 378 -46 369 -168 62 
A. Agriculture, forestry and fishing : 0 0 2 0 : : : : : : 0 : 1 
B. Mining and quarrying : 0 0 20 0 : 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C. Manufacturing : : 0 115 45 13 48 52 25 43 -55 -50 -205 19 
D35. Electricity, gas, steam and air  
conditioning supply 
: 0 0 111 0 23 118 : 0 -1 : 0 : 0 
E. Water supply; sewerage, waste  
management and remediation activities 
: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 : : 0 0 0 0 
F. Construction : 0 : 146 60 5 22 4 10 0 : 0 0 0 
G–U. Services : : : 1 429 183 562 508 63 7 319 4 419 37 42 
   G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of  
   motor vehicles and motorcycles 
: 0 : 255 19 193 81 24 3 44 -11 51 7 6 
   H. Transportation and storage : 0 8 1 0 7 30 4 : 7 : 402 : 0 
   I. Accommodation and food service activities : 0 0 224 17 1 3 1 0 : : 0 7 13 
   J. Information and communication : 0 0 1 0 6 9 1 0 0 0 -2 : 0 
   K. Financial and insurance activities : : : 52 0 63 253 2 0 : 0 0 : -1 
   L. Real estate activities : 0 0 847 63 253 112 26 0 80 : 0 0 13 
   M. Professional, scientific and technical activities : : : 32 79 20 10 2 0 11 19 0 22 11 
   N. Administrative and support service activities : 0 0 13 5 16 2 2 0 : -3 -31 1 0 
   O/T/U. Public administration; activities of  
   households and of extraterritorial organisations 
: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 : 0 : 0 : 
   P85. Education : 0 0 0 0 0 2 : 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   Q. Human health and social work activities : 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   R. Arts, entertainment and recreation : 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 : 0 0 0 0 0 
   S. Other service activities  : 0 0 3 0 2 1 : 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private real estate activities : 0 0 0 0 0 : 99 0 297 0 0 0 0 
Not allocated : 118 0 109 0 43 25 0 0 : 0 0 0 0 
  : Not available. 
  Source: Own compilation based on Eurostat (2017b). 
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players linked to the food industry and building materials manufacturers have all 
expanded abroad. In the service sector, the EU market has proved to be a tough 
challenge for most Russian players because of the strong competition, especially for 
insurance companies (during the global financial crisis, Ingosstrakh and Reso postponed 
plans to expand into the EU until better times). Nonetheless, some Russian 
multinationals have achieved success in this sector, firstly in Central and Eastern 
Europe. For example, the Bank of Moscow expanded to Latvia and Estonia.40 But the 
foreign acquisition by Sberbank in 2012 constitutes a much more significant step.41 
Finally, Russian multinationals have also gained presence in atypical sectors. For 
instance, belonging to the Sistema conglomerate, the oldest Russian tourism company 
Intourist has hotels in the EU as well.42 Following successful expansion in Africa and 
India, UTair established a subsidiary in Slovakia to provide helicopter services in 
Europe. Kaspersky Lab and the IBS Group (through Luxoft) have internationalized their 
activities in software development. Interfax news agency has also developed its foreign 
network (Kuznetsov, 2010b: 28). 
Russian real estate purchases in Europe can be basically divided into two groups. The 
first group includes real estate purchases by the richest Russians that have constantly 
been observed from the 1990s onwards. Investment in real estate abroad was one of the 
most well-known forms of capital flight in the 1990s. Many oligarchs understand the 
instability of their situation and try to accumulate reserves abroad. Some Russian 
owners of palaces and villas also emigrated from Russia. The second group consists of 
smaller-scale purchases by the middle class, which have only recently become a massive 
phenomenon. The main factor, a push one, was the high real estate prices in Moscow, St. 
Petersburg and other large cities where representatives of the Russian middle class live 
and which they cannot afford. At the same time, putting personal cash into Russian 
stocks is very risky, while savings in banks are unprofitable. Thus, first, buying foreign 
high-quality cars became popular, after which more and more funds have begun to be 
directed toward the purchase of “dachas” (summer cottages or seasonal homes) in 
                                                 
40 The Latvian bank is no longer owned by the Bank of Moscow. Even its name was changed, but it has 
remained in Russian hands. 
41 Currently, Sberbank is being targeted by EU sanctions, but not by the US. In contrast, US sanctions are 
hitting the Bank of Moscow. 
42 Intourist’s hotels are managed by the Cosmos Group. 
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Russian provinces and abroad since the mid-2000s (Gutnik, 2010: 88; Kuznetsov, 2010a: 
4; 2011b: 7). 
Most of the real estate purchases are done by individuals, while the role of Russian 
multinationals is relatively small. However, examples for the latter include Intourist’s 
five-star hotels in Karlovy Vary in the Czech Republic (Savoy Westend Hotel) and in 
Forte dei Marmi in Italy (Principe) (Cosmos Group, n.d.), or the Beetham Tower (or One 
Blackfriars Road Tower) in London, an unsuccessful project of Sergei Polonsky’s Mirax 
Group, a former real estate development company (Designbuild-network.com, n.d.). 
The Moscow-based Gordon Rock real estate agency developed two lists of target 
countries of real estate purchases by Russians abroad. If the buyer intends to live in the 
property or wants to use it as a “dacha”, then the list of countries is the following 
(excluding the CIS): Bulgaria, Spain, Montenegro, Germany, Turkey, the Czech Republic, 
Latvia, Italy and France. When purchasing real estate as an investment, the list is as 
follows: Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Austria, Switzerland, 
Spain, the Czech Republic, Israel and Latvia (Agureyeva, 2014). 
 
3.4. EU-specific motives of Russian OFDI 
In the EU, the most important motives of Russian multinationals consist of sales 
promotion, access to, and retention of, markets. Most Russian multinationals are major 
exporters, while the EU is Russia’s main trading partner. Compared to the domestic 
market and developing countries, Russian OFDI investors see poor prospects in Western 
Europe and CEE for access to raw materials and increasing efficiency by lower labour 
costs (Kuznetsov, 2011a: 10). According to Kuznetsov (2011a: 10), the role of strategic-
asset-seeking FDI (access to new technologies or the development of cross-border 
production chains) is small (see above), though it would be important for the 
modernization of the domestic economy. Russian energy multinationals have headed 
towards the vertical integration of supply chains (oil companies by purchasing foreign 
refineries and filling stations, while Gazprom by investing in infrastructure). However, 
this direction has recently been challenged. In the oil sector, Lukoil has been selling its 
European downstream assets and Rosneft, Russia’s state oil champion, has also 
downsized its European investment programmes. In the gas sector, the creation of the 
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single gas and electricity markets in the EU (including the EU’s Third Energy Package) 
and the ambitious climate governance constitute an abrupt transformation of a long-
standing model of cooperation between Russia and the West (Deák, 2017). Many 
Russian metallurgical multinationals have had research and development centres in 
Europe, but their research and development spending has been very small in the EU, and 
technology transfer has been more frequent in North American plants. Among the 
largest Russian multinationals, only Renova and Sistema conglomerates can be 
highlighted in terms of innovation (Kuznetsov, 2011a: 10–11). 
Russian steel exporters are subject to import regulation and market protection on the 
EU market. With Russia’s accession to the WTO in December 2011, EU quotas for 
Russian steel products ceased to exist, though Russia had not fully utilised the quotas 
even before that. However, anti-dumping procedures continue to be a problem for 
Russia in the EU. 
Kuznetsov (2011a: 11) claims that it was common for Russian multinationals to 
strengthen their position in the EU before listing their shares or depositary receipts on 
European stock exchanges. More concretely, Russian companies bought subsidiaries in 
the EU in 2006–2007 to make their IPO abroad comfortably (Alexey Kuznetsov, personal 
communication, 4 December 2015). The motive of attracting much cheaper sources of 
financing as compared to domestic funds was typical for the period prior to the 2008–
2009 crisis, owing to the underdeveloped domestic stock market. Finally, for many 
Russian multinationals, the EU is still attractive because of its political stability, securing 
themselves against the possible nationalization of assets in Russia (Kuznetsov, 2011a: 
11). 
 
 
4. Some patterns and trends of Russian FDI and multinationals in five CEE 
countries 
 
CBR statistics show the five CEE countries accumulated only 0.7 per cent of Russian 
OFDI stock at the end of 2016 (Table 9) (CBR, 2017c). Thus, Russian official statistics 
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indicate they played a minor role.43 Only the Czech Republic held a relatively larger 
Russian FDI stock as of end-2016. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia combined 
have attracted less Russian FDI than the Czech Republic alone. However, at the end of 
both 2009 and 2010, Hungary took a leading position in Central and Eastern Europe in 
terms of attracting Russian FDI. This proved to be temporary, and was only due to one 
item, i.e. the acquisition of shares in the Hungarian oil and gas company Mol by Russia’s 
Surgutneftegaz. Due to local resistance to the 2009 takeover, Surgutneftegaz sold the 
stake to the Hungarian government in 2011. 
 
Box 2. Understanding the low Russian FDI presence in Hungary 
The reasons for the low Russian FDI activity in Hungary are manifold. Hungary had a relatively 
swift economic transformation and an extensive privatization process, including in some 
major segments of the energy sector in the 1990s. Key positions in the national economy had 
already been occupied by private companies by the late 1990s, when – with a couple of 
exceptions44 – the first Russian actors capable of investing abroad consolidated themselves. By 
the late 1990s, Hungary had almost fully privatized its economy. In the energy sector, the 
emergence of a domestic private company, Mol, played a crucial role in fighting back Russian 
investment efforts. In turn, Prime Minister Orbán’s recent drive for renationalization partly 
explains his limited openness to new Russian FDI. The Hungarian government has recently 
bought back a high number of energy assets from Western investors, and it would like to keep 
these for the long term. In certain cases, EU regulatory issues also work in ways that run 
counter to Russian FDI expectations. For example, the EU’s Third Energy Package limits 
Russia’s abilities. Furthermore, Russian capabilities for new investments have been 
diminished by the 2008–2009 financial crisis and, more recently, by low oil prices and 
Western sanctions. In recent years, the investment climate in Hungary has also been 
unfavourable. It is clear that the controversial “crisis tax” has negatively affected Russian 
players. The so-called “Robin Hood” tax is a burden on energy firms, while a tax on public 
utility pipelines and cables has also been introduced. Furthermore, cultural gaps, the non-
Slavic language and the lack of a sizeable Russian diaspora have limited the Russian outreach 
for many individuals and smaller companies (Weiner, 2015; Deák and Weiner, 2016). 
Using company data and case studies, Weiner (2017a) demonstrates that the activities of 
Russian investors in Hungary have been paved with failures. These have been evident in both 
divestments and unrealised plans. Kalotay et al. (2014) suggest that the low share of Russian 
investment in the Visegrad countries may be referred to as business opportunities that the 
Russian parties failed to exploit. Weiner (2017a) confirms this assumption in the case of 
Hungary. 
 
As compared to CBR data, IMEMO calculates lower Russian FDI in the Czech Republic 
but higher in Poland (Table 13). The significant negative gap in the Czech Republic could  
 
                                                 
43 In Box 2, we try to explain the low figures for Russian FDI in Hungary. 
44 Until 2000, Gazprom and Lukoil accounted for around 90 per cent of Russia’s assets abroad (RUSAL–
EIU, 2006: 17). 
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Table 13. Comparing Russian FDI stock in five CEE countries using different methodologies, end of period 
(millions of dollars and millions of euros) 
 IMEMO (mln USD) CBR (mln USD) Eurostat (mln EUR) 
2014 2015 2016 2016 2016 
Total Equity Debt instr. Total Equity Debt instr. 
Czech Rep. 988 909 932 1 894 1 806 88 613 659 -46 
Hungary 196 141 165 264 260 5 -47 38 -85 
Poland 1 407 1 339 1 144 578 457 121 271 421 -150 
Slovakia 330 333 89 129 117 12 -204 5 -210 
Slovenia 178 182 140 194 139 56 73 42 31 
Source: Own compilations based on EABR (2017: 24), CBR (2017c), Eurostat (2017b) and IMEMO’s 
database. 
 
be explained by FDI in real estate, while the difference in data in Poland could be related 
to re-estimates of stocks by the CBR (perhaps regarding Gazprom’s FDI) and trans-
shipping FDI (in the case of Roust – Russian Standard) (Alexey Kuznetsov, personal 
communication, 16 December 2017). 
Based on national statistics, Eurostat indicates lower numbers for all the five 
countries than those provided by both the CBR and IMEMO’s database. Moreover, in 
Hungary and Slovakia, the values of IFDI stock from Russia are negative. If Russian FDI 
stock data are disaggregated into equity and debt instruments, one will see that these 
negative total data are recorded simply because of negative debt instrument stocks, i.e. 
the negative stocks of debt instruments (“negative net liabilities”) are larger than the 
positive stocks of equity (“positive net liabilities”). In the case of Hungary, we have a 
detailed answer to this issue. The stocks of debt instruments are negative mainly 
because of trade-credit claims (more precisely, claims are larger than liabilities). These 
are trade credits among corporate group members in a direct investment relationship. 
Specifically, foreign (i.e. non-Hungarian and non-Russian) multinationals have 
subsidiaries both in Hungary and Russia, and these Hungarian subsidiaries trade with 
the Russian subsidiaries. Most notably, Hungarian subsidiaries supply goods and 
services to the Russian subsidiaries, reflected in the higher stocks of claims (assets) than 
those of the liabilities (Weiner, 2017a: 198–199). As noted above, the Hungarian central 
bank, the MNB, started publishing inward FDI positions calculated by the ultimate 
investor. For end-2015, the MNB shows Russian FDI stock totalled EUR -46.4 million on 
the basis of the immediate investing country45 and EUR 161.1 million by the ultimate 
                                                 
45 These calculations do not include special-purpose entities. 
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owner (MNB, 2017a, 2017b),46 compared to the CBR’s USD 230 million based on the 
immediate host country (CBR, 2017c). 
 
4.1. A snapshot of the main Russian-involved companies in five CEE countries 
 
4.1.1. Poland 
Russia is a surprisingly small investor in Poland despite the common economic 
heritage and geographic proximity of the two countries and also despite the fact that 
Poland was the second main destination of Russian OFDI behind the United States in 
1995–1999 (Kalotay, 2003: 11–13; Kalotay et al, 2014: 12). Russian oil and gas as well 
as metal multinationals have been represented in Poland through the FDI activities of 
Gazprom, Lukoil and Severstal. However, Lukoil divested its downstream assets in 2016. 
Gazprom’s main interest in Poland is its ownership in EuRoPol GAZ, the owner of the 
Polish section of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, carrying Russian gas to Poland and 
Germany (and onwards) via Belarus. In Poland, Gazprom also concentrates on the use of 
natural gas – both compressed and liquefied natural gas (CNG and LNG) – as a fuel for 
vehicles. Severstal’s Severstallat established a pipe producer and steel distributor 
company, which acquired assets in Poland. Besides resource-based companies, software 
and information technology constitute another important part of Russian FDI in Poland, 
including the activities of Luxoft (a leading global provider of software development 
services and IT solutions, controlled by Anatoly Karachinsky’s IBS Group) and 
Kaspersky Lab (a well-known cybersecurity and anti-virus provider, owned by ex-Soviet 
intelligence officer Eugene Kaspersky). Russia’s Ekoton represents the engineering 
sector, focusing on application for integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC) 
permits, environmental impact assessment (EIA), ecological/environmental audits, 
Natura 2000 reports, environmental programs, asbestos removal plans and regional 
development strategies, including tourism development strategies. Finally, it is 
important to mention the acquisition of vodka producer and spirits distributor Central 
European Distribution Corporation (CEDC) of Poland by Russian Standard, owned by 
                                                 
46 End-2016 data by the ultimate owner have not yet been made available. 
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billionaire Roustam Tariko. In addition to these, Poland has also been the target of a 
couple of unsuccessful takeover attempts made by Russian firms. 
 
4.1.2. Czech Republic 
Although Russia’s share in the IFDI stock of the Czech Republic is small, there are 
several important companies that are in Russian hands. Regarding the oil and gas sector, 
Gazprom is involved in different segments of the Czech gas sector. It supplies final 
customers through Vemex and it co-owns an underground gas storage facility. Initially, 
Vemex sold gas exclusively to large- and medium-sized customers, but with the 
acquisition of a majority stake in Czech energy retailer RSP Energy in 2011 (renamed 
Vemex Energie), Vemex entered the retail and household sector of gas and electricity in 
the Czech Republic. Vemex is also active on the Slovak market (see below in Section 
4.1.4). In addition, the Gazprom Group owns public CNG stations in the Czech Republic, 
and Vemex also supplies automatic gas-filling compressor stations controlled by 
independent companies. Gazprom was also engaged in the Czech gas wholesaler Gas-
Invest. However, it was liquidated and then terminated in 2011. In contrast, Lukoil has 
not been successful in the Czech Republic. Lukoil has already twice left the Czech retail 
fuel market. In 2003, Lukoil sold its three petrol stations (E15.cz, 2014). Between 2006 
and 2014, Lukoil again owned petrol stations in the Czech Republic. Lukoil was also a jet 
fuel supplier through the company Lukoil Aviation Czech, which was mainly known 
among the public for its relations with Czech politicians. Following a scandal, Lukoil 
Aviation Czech was terminated in 2016. 
Russia has held a strong position in the Czech steel sector. Controlled by Roman 
Abramovich, Alexander Abramov and Alexander Frolov, Evraz, a major metallurgical and 
mining company bought Vítkovice Steel of the Czech Republic, a manufacturer of rolled 
steel products, during the privatization conducted in 2005 through its Cyprus-registered 
subsidiary Mastercraft Ltd. Vítkovice Steel took on the new name Evraz Vítkovice Steel 
(EVS). However, in 2014, a private investor group, including five Cyprus front 
companies, bought EVS. Evraz refused to identify the beneficial owners of the Cyprus 
entities (Helmer, 2014). In 2007, EVS acquired Nikom of the Czech Republic which 
converts vanadium oxide produced by Russia’s Evraz Vanady Tula into ferrovanadium, 
which is then used by the steel industry. Renamed to Evraz Nikom in mid-2012, the 
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company has been in the hands of Evraz Group S.A. of Luxembourg since the end of 
2012.47 
In 2004, the year of the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU, OMZ, whose principal 
shareholder is Gazprombank,48 acquired three Skoda Holding subsidiaries, Skoda 
Jaderne Strojirenstvi (Skoda JS), a supplier of technologies for the nuclear power 
industry; Skoda Hute, a company with a focus on the production of steel and pig-iron 
forgings; and Skoda Kovarny, a dominant world leader in the manufacture of four-stroke 
diesel motor cranks and wind power station shafts. Reportedly, the acquisition 
represented the biggest post-1989 Russian investment in the Czech Republic (New 
Europe, 2004). In 2007, Skoda Hute and Skoda Kovarny were merged and renamed 
Pilsen Steel, but was finally bought in 2010 by the Luxembourg-registered United Group, 
established in 2008, with an operating office in Moscow and belonging to Russian 
investor Igor Shamis. Skoda JS has a subsidiary in Slovakia, Skoda Slovakia (see Section 
4.1.4), and also holds ownership stakes in ÚJV Řež of the Czech Republic (concentrating 
primarily on design and engineering, supporting the safe and efficient operation of 
nuclear and classical power plants, fuel cycle chemistry, as well as on providing complex 
services for radioactive waste management) and MKHO Interatomenergo of Russia 
(providing services for the design, installation and maintenance of integrated security 
systems). In 2007, OMZ acquired the Brno-based Cheteng Engineering (formerly 
Chepos), active in design, procurement and construction services. However, Cheteng 
ended in liquidation. 
In addition, Russian FDI investors have been engaged in a couple of other important 
FDI projects in the Czech machinery sector. The first foreign assets of ChTPZ Group 
(Chelyabinsk Tube-Rolling Plant) or ChelPipe, controlled by Andrei Komarov, was MSA, 
a manufacturer of pipeline valves in the Czech Republic, acquired in 2006. Urals Mining 
and Metals Company (UMMC, also known as UGMK) acquired a 51 per cent stake in the 
Czech aircraft manufacturer Aircraft Industries, formerly LET Kunovice, in 2008, which 
it increased to 100 per cent in 2013. UGMK is a top Russian producer of copper, zinc, 
coal, gold and silver. Its principal owner is Iskander Makhmudov. Aircraft Industries also 
operates Kunovice’s private international airport and an aviation high school. 
                                                 
47 Evraz Group S.A. is a holding company controlled by the London-headquartered Evraz plc. 
48 Gazprom has not had control over Gazprombank for many years. 
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There is another Russian-involved company in the Czech Republic that is related to 
the nuclear sector. In 2011, TVEL, belonging to the Russian Rosatom Group, and the 
Czech engineering company Alta Invest formed a joint venture, Alvel, majority owned by 
Alta, with the aim of localising fuel services for Czech and European nuclear power 
plants and promoting TVEL fuel types designed for Western reactors. Rosatom’s 
representative office responsible for the Central Europen region is based in the Czech 
Republic (called Rosatom Central Europe), with a branch located in Hungary. 
The next important Russian-owned company deals with software solutions and 
electronic production. Sistema’s company in the Czech Republic, NVision Czech Republic 
a.s., is the main research and development centre of Russia’s NVision Group OSS/BSS 
(operations support systems, OSS; business support systems, BSS) division. Controlled 
by Vladimir Yevtushenkov, the Russian Sistema conglomerate is mainly interested in 
information technology, telecommunications and microelectronics in the EU. 
In the light industry, the workwear manufacturer Vostok-Service has pursued 
successful international expansion through Cerva Export Import of the Czech Republic, 
bought by Vostok-Service in 2006. Cerva were the first foreign assets of Vostok-Service, 
owned by former Russian parliamentarian and member of the ruling United Russia 
party Vladimir Golovnev. 
Two Russian banks – the First Czech–Russian Bank (FCRB) and Sberbank – have 
owned subsidiaries in the Czech Republic. The Czech central bank granted an operating 
license to the FCRB subsidiary, ERB in 2008. The FCRB was founded in 1996 with 
majority shares by the now-defunct Czech Investment and Post Bank (IPB Bank) and is 
now controlled by Russian businessman Roman Popov. However, in July 2016, the CBR 
revoked FCRB’s licence and in October 2016 ERB Bank also lost its license. In 2012, 
Sberbank, Russia’s largest lender controlled by the CBR, became the owner of Volksbank 
International AG (though the transaction did not include the Romanian subsidiary). It 
bought operations in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and also Ukraine. In the Czech Republic, Sberbank has 28 
branches. 
Finally, Russians have established a palpable presence in the Czech real-estate 
industry. First of all, they have very significant capital investment in hotels and other 
real estate in the famous Karlovy Vary spa resort. 
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4.1.3. Hungary 
For almost 20 years after 1989, Russian corporate presence in Hungary was 
facilitated through the activities of Megdet Rakhimkulov, a former senior manager at 
Gazprom and its Hungarian representative. In 1996, Gazprombank (at that time, 
Gazprom’s subsidiary) purchased a Hungarian bank, the General Banking and Trust 
(ÁÉB), which was later gradually taken over by the Rakhimkulov family’s companies. His 
influence reached its zenith in the mid-2000s. Over the next years, he gradually retired 
and formally moved back to Moscow. His two sons took over much of the family’s 
business activities in Hungary and Cyprus. In the 2000s, the Rakhimkulov family 
rationalized its portfolio, decreasing their shares of some sectoral assets. All the 
chemical and machine-industry plants and even ÁÉB were sold in the mid-2000s. 
Gazprom’s main ownership interest in Hungary is Panrusgáz, an intermediary joint 
venture for Russian gas imports. Among the Hungarian gas traders, two have Russian 
owners. One is Centrex Hungary, an affiliate of the Gazprombank-owned and Vienna-
based Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG, and the other company is WIEE Hungary, a 
subsidiary of Gazprom Schweiz. Until recently, there was also a third trader, an obscure 
one, called MET Hungary, which had some Russian interest. Gazprom’s other plans and 
projects in Hungary include failures. Investment in Hungary’s oil industry has also 
included many failed efforts, including those of Yukos, Surgutneftegaz, Lukoil and 
Gazprom Neft. Yet, Gazprom Neft, Gazprom’s oil arm and Russia’s fourth-largest crude 
producer, is still active in Hungary via Serbia’s NIS oil company, the majority of which is 
owned by Gazprom Neft. 
Apart from Russia’s presence in the energy sector, there are only a limited number of 
important assets in Russian ownership. In Hungary, there have only been two Russian-
owned banks, including, in the past, the ÁÉB, and, now, a subsidiary of Sberbank. 
Additionally, the Rakhimkulov family’s 8.9 per cent stake (with a voting power of 9.0 per 
cent) in Hungary’s leading retail bank, OTP Bank, considered a portfolio investment and 
estimated at 0.5 per cent of Hungary’s GDP, is also important to mention as this 
constitutes by far the biggest item on the list of Russian investments in Hungary. 
Additionally, there is a strong Russian presence in Hungarian metallurgy, and there 
have also been a few Russian capital-related projects in Hungary’s machinery worth 
mentioning. One large Russian (and also Ukrainian) industrial investment in Hungary is 
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the ISD Dunaferr steel plant. At the end of 2003, Dunaferr was tendered and bought by a 
consortium, consisting of Ukraine’s Industrial Union of Donbass (ISD) and the Swiss 
Duferco International Trading Holding Ltd. Severstal also submitted a bid. However, a 
change of ownership occurred in late 2009, when Russian investors obtained a stake of 
50 per cent plus two shares in the metallurgical assets of ISD. After that, as a creditor, 
Russia’s state-owned Vnesheconombank (VEB) practically controlled ISD, but in 2017, 
Hungarian media sources suggested that Dunaferr had a new Russian owner, Suleyman 
Kerimov, a Russian billionaire and representative of the Republic of Dagestan in the 
Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of Russia (Vg.hu, 2017). 
In the same sector, though not in production, but in sales, a Hungarian affiliate of the 
Russian mining and metals company Mechel has played some role. The company, called 
Mechel Service Hungary, has sold Mechel’s steel products to Hungarian customers, but is 
now under voluntary liquidation. 
Another Russian-related company is VBH Budapest, a wholesaler and retailer of 
metal fittings. It is the Hungarian subsidiary of the German VBH Holding GmbH, a 
market leader in the fittings industry in Europe, majority-owned by the Russian 
businessman Viktor Trenev. 
In the Hungarian machine-building industry, in light of the construction of new units 
at Hungary’s Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Paks-2), the most relevant company with 
Russian involvement is Ganz Engineering and Energetics Machinery, owned by TsKBM, a 
part of Rosatom’s machine-building division Atomenergomash. Ganz Engineering and 
Energetics Machinery is involved in the manufacture and installation of hydromachines, 
nuclear power station machinery and oil drilling equipment. 
The activities of Uraltrak are also related to the machine industry. Established in 
1990, it is the only official Hungarian dealer of Russia’s Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant–
Uraltrak, owned by the Russian state-owned tank and railway car manufacturer 
Uralvagonzavod. 
Renova Group, whose beneficial owner is Viktor Vekselberg, a Russian tycoon, has 
been present in Hungary with three Swiss high-tech and engineering groups (Oerlikon, 
Sulzer and Schmolz + Bickenbach), in which it owns significant or controlling stakes. 
However, Sulzer’s Hungarian subsidiary, Sulzer Pumps Wastewater Hungary, was sold 
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in 2013. Under its new name Zultzer Pumpen, the company continues its activities in the 
sales, service and operation of pumps, mixers, flow boosters, fans and blowers. Of the 
production sites of the Oerlikon Group, one is located in Hungary. Oerlikon Eldim (HU) 
produces honeycomb products used in aero engines. The third subsidiary, 
Schmolz + Bickenbach Magyarország is a wholesaler of specialty steels deriving from the 
group’s mills. 
Interestingly, Russians also have some link to the Hungarian electronics industry as 
Rosneft holds a very minor stake in Orion Electronics that provides electronics 
manufacturing and marketing and distribution services. 
Another relatively widely known Russia-owned company is LIT Budapest that deals 
with disinfection technologies, including the use of UV in the treatment of drinking 
water, wastewater, technological water and water for swimming pools and spas. The 
company’s main activities encompass the sale and installation of equipment, 
maintenance and servicing. Russia’s LIT is reportedly among the world’s top three 
developers and manufacturers of UV systems for water, air and surface disinfection. 
The activities of Russian investors in the logistics and transportation industry have 
been paved with failures. An exception is GEFCO Hungary, a subsidiary of the French 
GEFCO S.A., 75 per cent owned by Russian Railways RZD. With its headquarters in 
Budapest, its logistics base is located in Biatorbágy, a village near the capital. GEFCO S.A. 
offers a wide range of logistics services and transport solutions by road, sea, air and rail. 
The presence of Russian residents in Hungary’s real-estate market is a visible 
phenomenon, though Hungary is not among the top destinations for residential real-
estate purchases by Russians. The 232-room Lotus Therme Hotel & Spa, the only five-
star hotel in the spa city of Hévíz can serve as an example of the presence of Russians in 
the Hungarian hotel and spa industry. 
Russian FDI in Hungary could have been much larger than it is at present, but – 
similarly as in the case of Poland – Russian investors have been involved in a couple of 
unsuccessful takeover attempts in Hungary, which failed due to local resistance to 
Russian capital.  
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4.1.4. Slovakia 
In Slovakia, Russia has quite moderate FDI activities and is more about failures than 
success. In the gas sector, Gazprom is active only with a Vemex subsidiary, Vemex 
Energo, founded in 2003 to trade in gas and electricity. Vemex Energo should not be 
confused with the above-mentioned Vemex Energie of the Czech Republic. The Gazprom 
joint venture, Slovrusgas, a middleman gas trader went into liquidation in 2005 and was 
dissolved in 2010. In the oil sector, although Yukos took over a 49 per cent stake in 
Slovakia’s oil transporter Transpetrol during the privatisation process conducted in 
2002, the Slovakian state bought it back in 2009. Another failure relates to Lukoil, which 
sold its Slovakian filling stations. Sberbank’s activities were also discontinued in 
Slovakia. In 2016, Penta Investments, a Czech–Slovak financial group, became the 99.5 
per cent owner of Sberbank Slovensko, Sberbank’s Slovakian subsidiary. In 2017, 
Sberbank Slovensko was merged into Prima banka Slovensko, 99 per cent owned by 
Penta. Sberbank had 39 offices in Slovakia. In contrast, Slovakia has performed an 
important role in the activities of UTair, Russia’s No. 1 helicopter operator and world 
leader in the helicopter market in terms of fleet size and carrying capacity. The main 
base of UTair in Europe is the international airport at the spa town of Piestany in 
Slovakia. UTair Europe’s helicopters are used for aerial work mostly in inaccessible 
terrain. Finally, as indicated, Skoda JS of the Czech Republic also runs a subsidiary in 
Slovakia. Skoda Slovakia was founded in 1995 and deals with the construction, 
maintenance, repair, modernization and decommissioning of facilities in nuclear 
energetics and of hydropower plants and in classical energetics, chemical, petrochemical 
and heavy industry, as well as trading and transport. Aside from these, Atomstroyexport, 
the foreign trade engineering company of Rosatom, as well as the general contractor for 
Hungary’s Paks-2, has also participated in a couple of very important non-FDI project in 
Slovakia (regarding the Mochovce and Bohunice nuclear power plants, partly with Skoda 
JS). 
 
4.1.5. Slovenia 
The first serious Russian FDI investor in Slovenia was the Kemerovo coking coal 
plant, known as Koks, one of Russia’s leading producers and exporters of merchant 
metallurgical coke. Koks is part of the Industrial Metallurgical Holding, owned by the 
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family of the State Duma deputy Boris Zubitsky. In 2007, through privatization, Koks 
bought the majority of the SIJ Group, the largest Slovenian vertically integrated 
metallurgical group. In Slovenia, Sberbank operates a network of only 12 branch offices. 
In addition, Russia has some interest in Slovenian tourism. In 2012, Platanus, a 
Slovenian firm owned by a Russian citizen and incorporated in 2010 bought a majority 
stake in the Maribor-based tourism company Terme Maribor. Slovenia would have 
received significant amounts of Russian FDI and gained an important transit role if the 
South Stream gas pipeline had been built. 
 
4.2. FDI theorems and Russian multinationals in five CEE countries 
With the participation of the present author, Kalotay et al. (2014, 2015, 2016) asked 
whether the presence of Russian multinationals in the Visegrad countries could be 
explained by using the OLI framework. Contrary to findings in the literature on other 
emerging multinationals (Narula, 2006; Mathews, 2002), we found only traces of 
acquiring competitive advantages or ownership advantages. Rather, we identified 
investment aiming at exploiting existing advantages. This may be due to the fact that 
there is a very small number of this type of acquisition targets in the Visegrad countries. 
As for Russian firms’ asset-based advantages, it is obvious that their access to raw 
materials49 and related technical knowledge are very important for their investments in 
the Visegrad countries, as investment in oil, gas and metals are predominant. Another 
industry performing similarly is nuclear energy production. The asset-based advantages 
of Russian firms in the Visegrad countries are closely related to their transaction-based 
advantages. Both the asset and transactional ownership advantages of Russian firms are 
reinforced by the locational advantages of Visegrad countries as these countries rely 
almost exclusively on certain Russian natural resources. Similarly to hydrocarbons, iron 
and steel, as well as nuclear energy industries, the machinery industry also shows an 
interconnection of ownership and locational advantages. For technology-based 
companies, the locational advantages are not specific to the Visegrad countries in the 
case of market-seeking motivations; but such factors are involved when it comes to 
efficiency-seeking motivations. Investigating the motives and patterns of Russian 
                                                 
49 Perhaps some clarification is needed here. We meant here that the ownership advantages of Russian 
companies come from the control of raw materials rather than the desire to obtain raw materials in the 
Visegrad countries. 
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investment in the Visegrad countries, we can state that the technology-based firms show 
characteristics similar to developed-country multinationals. Other large state-owned 
and natural-resource-based firms are not similar to traditional multinationals. Yet 
others, for example real-estate investors, fall under no straightforward categorization. A 
locational disadvantage specific to the Visegrad countries is also at play. As mentioned, 
several examples of negative approaches towards Russian capital in the Visegrad 
countries could be found, though the reactions of the Visegrad host governments to 
Russian multinationals have been mixed. The expansion of Russian multinationals in the 
Visegrad countries is similar to other emerging-country multinationals in the form of 
relatively high state involvement, either transparently or in an indirect way. The role of 
the Russian state and the Russian economic-policy environment in prompting OFDI 
raises the issue whether that factor can be assimilated under transaction-based 
advantages, or a home-country factor has to be added to the OLI legs. We suggested that 
the main elements of the OLI paradigm could be applied when explaining Russian FDI in 
the Visegrad countries, but its extension with home-country factors seemed to be 
necessary. This refers first of all to natural-resource-based multinationals, mainly oil, 
gas and steel, but home-country interest is also prevalent in other industries. In the case 
of Russian multinationals active in innovative industries, home-country factors play a 
minor role. Russian FDI in our fifth country, Slovenia, seems to confirm what we found 
in the four Visegrad countries regarding the theorems. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
Russia has a long history of OFDI, with the golden era ending with the global financial 
crisis. By that time, Russian multinationals had become significant factors in 
international capital flows, though they are not ranked among the largest multinationals. 
Having faced two financial crises over the past 10 years that interrupted the upward 
trend, the current period is rather about their survival. 
Several important features of Russian OFDI should be noted. Among them, the 
phenomenon of round-tripping leads to Russian FDI being overestimated in both 
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directions. Round-tripping and the offshore orientation of Russian OFDI are strongly 
related to negative domestic push factors (including the poor business climate in 
Russia), as well as to the tax minimization strategies of Russian multinationals. Negative 
push factors are very important in driving corporate decisions to invest abroad. 
Concerning a typical positive push factor, the Russian state’s role in directly promoting 
foreign expansion, one can argue that the state supports only the largest Russian 
multinationals but Russian OFDI is not dominated by state-controlled companies. State-
owned companies possess many advantages that can help them internationalize. 
However, the Russian state’s influence on private companies is also frequently quite 
significant. The leading Russian private multinationals have an oligarchic ownership 
structure. Regarding the theorems, all our research suggests that the extension of the 
OLI theorem with a home-country leg to OLIH is needed, though it may require yet 
further tests in the future. 
Due to the specific features of Russian OFDI and the lack of statistics referring to the 
ultimate host/investing country, the role of certain host countries is underestimated, 
while that of others is overstated. Europe’s leading role in Russian OFDI remains 
unchallenged. Meanwhile, Europe’s share is falling, but this had already started many 
years ago, regardless of the EU–Russia relations that have definitely reached a very low 
point at present. As the Minsk II ceasefire agreement of February 2015 has not been met, 
the end of the sanctions by the European Union, Russia’s prime export market and the 
main destination of Russian OFDI, is not in sight. Russia’s pivot towards Asia as a means 
of diversifying away from Europe had been formulated before the events in Ukraine. 
Nonetheless, despite some steps in this direction, an explosion in Russian expansion has 
not been witnessed and is not projected. 
In Europe, possibly, the largest recipients of Russian FDI are Italy, Germany and the 
UK. In Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania can be mentioned. The 
five CEE countries are not among the main destinations, though Russian FDI in the Czech 
Republic or Poland is not negligible either. Even Slovenia has received notable Russian-
involved companies. Nevertheless, company data demonstrate that the activities of 
Russian investors in five CEE countries have been paved with failures. These have been 
evident in both divestments and unrealised plans. The low share of Russian investment 
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in five CEE countries may be referred to as business opportunities that the Russian 
parties failed to exploit. 
In general, Russian OFDI is still dominated by oil and gas multinationals, though 
Russian businesses are represented practically in every sector. In our five CEE countries, 
most Russian FDI has been done in hydrocarbons, iron and steel and machinery, but 
banking, software solutions, electronic production, real estate and even the light 
industry have also been targeted. 
Opposition to Russian investment could continue to grow in the EU. While examples 
of Russian pressure on companies to sell to them have been known to occur in CEE 
countries within the EU, there are also already precedents in Western EU states for 
transactions that have failed because of resistance to Russian investment. In general, 
there is no need to worry about Russian OFDI, but some of the concerns expressed are 
certainly attested. We believe that it is the Russian party who would benefit most from 
alleviating these fears. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Russian FDI flows into the EU, according to Eurostat, 2004–2016 (millions of euros) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013a 2014a 2015a 2016a 
EU28 : : : : 2 814 12 485 7 621 2 855 7 975 4 925 
(-1 818) 
12 186 
(8 216) 
17 840 
(15 107) 
7 392 
(4 608) 
EU27 261 2 832 1 504 10 501 2 809 12 477 7 610 2 824 7 945     
EU25 275 2 723 1 363 10 226 2 460 12 303 7 373 2 615 7 702     
EU15 424 1 962 2 287 10 020 -414 -189 -1 222 3 237 4 466     
EU15 plus Cyprus and Malta 
Belgium -10 5 -3 22 -10 -137 94 231 -77 -504 
(-645) 
438 
(532) 
565 
(317) 
101 
(-19) 
Denmark : 7 108 11 33 65 -49 158 139 -5 
(2) 
44 19 -4 
Germany  266 131 2 514 581 305 -1 430 95 55 146 1 144 792 914 576 
Ireland -2 -16 -34 648 -385 144 81 -24 148 124 -323 168 379 
Greece 6 : : : : : : 13 10 25 27 20 13 
Spain 47 86 147 : 484 358 494 654 833 : : : : 
France 12 34 64 156 59 75 211 130 993 149 342 154 207 
Italy 1 2 8 85 865 343 -319 -18 259 138 -60 126 -395 
Cyprus 93 302 172 279 318 461 -281 317 879 -1 954 -2 259 -9 -937 
Lux. -35 -1 082 -1 017 -1 021 -2 399 -705 -1 305 -626 1 216 : : : : 
Malta : : : : 3 1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 : 
Netherl. 10 22 21 55 64 11 2 90 89 1 142 
(841) 
12 457 
(11 630) 
-793 
(-204) 
3 992 
(3 674) 
Austria 85 76 35 124 -171 286 271 443 622 : : : : 
Portugal 0 0 1 : : : : 9 13 13 29 22 
(-1) 
24 
Finland 48 38 19 64 -35 138 77 60 9 : : -218 340 
Sweden -44 2 27 -130 -268 : -321 : -87 : 52 1 11 
UK : : : 485 : 1 : 219 47 : : : : 
EU-member CEE countries (EU11) 
Bulgaria -16 109 136 245 298 166 205 207 256 72 
(-0,3) 
131 30 23 
Croatia 2 6 19 70 5 9 11 31 30 41 69 46 22 
Estonia 47 57 55 -4 114 78 32 37 97 115 91 -27 38 
Latvia 24 70 6 37 60 9 20 48 156 : 269 102 171 
Lithuania 168 309 -1 086 230 148 4 158 92 -134 -63 -275 37 51 
Romania 2 1 5 29 51 8 31 2 -13 -17 -24 6 70 
   of which five CEE countries 
Czech R. 25 3 -18 -8 112 -29 24 39 -72 143 20 100 3 
Hungary 14 -7 0 -75 -751 938 267 -1 726 -22 33 
(2) 
436 -43 9 
Poland -522 29 -32 -245 -19 -68 -23 19 20 -34 72 9 16 
Slovakia 0 -3 9 -7 -5 -48 -84 -101 56 -48 -64 126 -39 
Slovenia 0 1 -2 28 5 -21 18 17 10 21 -19 -6 7 
: Not available. 
a Break in time series from 2013. 
Note: The value of stock held by special-purpose entities is in brackets where it is available and its value is 
different from 0.0. 
Source: Own compilation and calculations based on Eurostat (2015, 2017a). 
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Table A2. Russian FDI flows into the EU, according to the CBR, based on the asset/liability principle, 2007–
2016 (millions of dollars) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 44 801 55 663 43 281 52 616 66 851 48 822 86 507 57 082 22 085 22 581 
EU28a 32301 32262 26853 36107 39913 32224 18168 35834 9502 12760 
EU15 plus Cyprus and Malta 
Austria 230 253 458 847 512 1 035 5 265 1 135 746 258 
Belgium 80 49 36 36 61 536 -450 302 32 -44 
Cyprus 14 700 15 524 15 288 18 309 22 930 20 920 7 671 23 546 4 249 9 924 
Denmark -15 16 48 -4 389 215 752 0 401 307 
Finland 110 154 186 236 63 271 91 146 1 454 95 
France 257 217 386 334 656 1 430 449 523 74 121 
Germany 673 1 860 1 488 1 880 971 1 118 1 334 1 016 738 559 
Greece 33 58 32 318 88 63 98 185 12 15 
Ireland 230 299 -438 1 185 527 512 264 91 479 1 125 
Italy 87 295 158 315 387 403 538 587 117 165 
Luxembourg 497 2 633 765 2 483 2 005 -504 1 314 639 786 -1 683 
Malta 9 32 -1 8 -1 -10 2 40 4 -14 
Netherlands 11 991 4 684 3 376 7 035 9 901 2 599 -3 022 2 132 461 881 
Portugal 3 25 24 25 24 30 45 103 3 9 
Spain 258 458 375 490 812 980 1 356 1 879 152 125 
Sweden -55 177 256 203 489 390 -720 57 -1 34 
UK 2 454 3 886 1 997 1 232 1 474 632 1 294 1 935 -439 755 
EU-member CEE countries (EU11) 
Bulgaria 125 441 261 319 522 716 554 308 48 41 
Croatia 95 75 13 23 103 31 71 111 19 23 
Estonia 13 29 11 21 30 85 120 149 63 -5 
Latvia 79 166 78 147 328 348 568 513 -22 -73 
Lithuania 57 57 64 49 66 28 46 -66 3 8 
Romania 1 25 39 196 -96 -1 -101 -1 1 0 
   of which five CEE countries 
Czech R. 248 319 142 360 337 265 340 277 24 43 
Hungary 51 542 1 789 48 -2 724 67 155 67 12 13 
Poland 28 -50 13 -2 30 -2 73 31 67 43 
Slovakia 13 29 7 11 19 49 32 28 12 5 
Slovenia 49 9 2 3 10 18 29 101 7 30 
Non-EU-member CEE countries 
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 
Bosnia and Herz. 1 55 287 94 104 149 78 123 15 7 
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 3 0 1 
Montenegro 188 173 85 117 160 185 173 187 31 37 
Serbia 44 11 609 208 372 63 -39 -42 -10 -38 
a Own calculations resulting from the simple accumulation of country data. 
Source: CBR (2017d). 
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Table A3. The number of foreign and Russian-controlled enterprises in the EU, 2013–2015 
 2013 2014 2015 
Total Russian Total Russian Total Russian 
EU28 256 815 3 100 265 706 3 534 : : 
EU15 plus Cyprus and Malta 
Austria 9 926 132 10 164 137 10 484 138 
Belgium 1 384 5 1 344 5 1 317 5 
Cyprus 306 21 296 : 303 14 
Denmark 3 793 4 3 645 7 : : 
Finland 2 874 27 2 951 25 : : 
France 25 322 : 22 779 23 28 053 : 
Germany  26 869 133 28 076 149 27 698 150 
Greece 1 710 : 1 918 : 2 437 6 
Italy 12 150 38 12 509 49 12 836 48 
Ireland : : 3 729 : 3 305 : 
Luxembourg 8 910 : 9 346 9 9 388 : 
Malta 157 0 167 0 194 0 
Netherlands 12 077 30 12 494 48 12 557 44 
Portugal 4 775 0 5 812 1 5 931 1 
Spain 11 255 4 11 423 4 12 607 5 
Sweden 11 786 11 12 027 9 : : 
United Kingdom 21 432 14 22 230 13 : : 
EU-member CEE countries (EU11) 
Bulgaria 12 058 624 11 275 538 12 050 484 
Croatia 3 986 329 4 078 331 4 685 361 
Estonia 761 19 777 21 784 22 
Latvia 6 491 767 7 085 946 7 689 1 016 
Lithuania 3 361 143 3 629 152 3 833 196 
Romania 25 274 36 29 491 48 27 164 53 
   of which five CEE countries 
Czech Republic 13 104 81 12 991 96 12 613 119 
Hungary 17 689 134 18 273 166 17 180 155 
Poland 6 935 19 7 081 22 7 109 17 
Slovakia 3 136 : 3 493 : 3 604 10 
Slovenia 5 743 495 6 623 702 7 213 806 
: Not available. 
Source: Eurostat (2017d). 
 
Table A4. The number of Russian-controlled enterprises in the EU, breakdown by economic activity, 2014 
Total 3 534 
B. Mining and quarrying 8 
C. Manufacturing 277 
D. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 38 
E. Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities : 
F. Construction : 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1 022 
H. Transportation and storage : 
I. Accommodation and food service activities 218 
J. Information and communication : 
K. Financial and insurance activities : 
L. Real estate activities : 
M. Professional, scientific and technical activities 517 
N. Administrative and support service activities 207 
S95. Repair of computers and personal and household goods 3 
: Not available. 
Source: Eurostat (2017e). 
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